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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries are characterized by levels of 
living that are very low for the majority of people. Low 
levels of living are manifested in the form of low per 
capita income, inadequate housing, poor health, limited 
education, high infant mortality and a low life and work 
expectancy . Failure to achieve a minimum level of income 
above the poverty line has kept approximately forty per-
cent of the people of developing countries in absolute 
poverty. 
Developing countries are also characterized by low 
levels of agricultural productivity which may be explained 
by the absence or lack of complementary factor inputs -
capital or entrepreneurship - in relation to the avail-
ability of fixed amounts of other goods. 
Concern for these conditions has prompted officials 
of developing countries to develop and implement various 
policies aimed at alleviating them. Several international 
development agencies have contributed greatly to this effort. 
Development strategies adopted have emphasized 
industrialization and import substitution while neglecting 
the agricultural sector. Industrialization has been 
viewed as a superior way of life. Rich countries are 
largely industrial , poor countries are largely primary 
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producing or agricultural countries. Many developing coun-
tries have concentrated much of their economic activity on 
the industrial sector in an attempt to achieve a standard 
of living comparable to that enjoyed by many industrialized 
nations. 
Weaknesses in industrialization policies have in-
creasingly been recognized during past decades. If 
development and growth are to take place, foundations 
must be in both industrial and agricultural areas . The 
vast majority of a developing country's poor people live in 
rural areas and engage in subsistence level agricultural 
production. The basic concern of these people is for 
daily survival . Whatever progress may have been attained 
through industrialization policies have not significantly 
affected their lives. 
Problem 
Efforts to raise the level of agricultural output and 
to improve the welfare of farmers have led to increasingly 
large volumes of credit directed to the agricultural 
sector . 
The rural sector of a developing country is comprised 
largely of small farmers with low output levels . These 
farmers must compete with large farmers for any available 
financial resources. Any attempts to increase agricultural 
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output must first concentrate on the small farmer popu-
lation who receive a small share of institutional credit. 
Attempts to direct resources to the small farmer include 
various interest rate policies and the development of new 
public institutions. 
Interest rate policies and new institutions have not 
resulted in larger shares of credit to small farmers. This 
phenomenon can only be explained by institutional behavior 
and factors which affect a farmer's use of credit. 
Scope 
This study analyzes the different development strategies 
and the effect of each on a country's agricultural sector . 
The role of credit in determining the agricultural develop-
ment strategy is also discussed. 
Financial intermediaries play a vital role in de-
termining who will be granted loans. As such, they directly 
affect the efficiency or inefficiencies which may occur i n 
agricultural production. Production inefficiencies must 
be corrected . The correction of these inefficiencies 
first requires that institutional behavior be altered. 
Financial institutions must respond to the operating 
constraints placed on them. Any changes in institutional 
behavior must be preceded by policies directly affecting 
the institution itself. 
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Methodology 
Available literature in the area of agricultural 
credit is extensive. However, an attempt has been made 
to identify the most crucial and problematic areas of 
credit to small farmers. Having delimited the area 
of study, a more detailed examination will be conducted 
on the chosen areas. The method used in the examination 
of each area will be that of a literature survey. A 
competitive industry production model will be presented 
and evaluated. Comparative statistics analysis of this 
model will be presented and interpreted. 
Economic Growth and Development - Why? 
Two-thirds of the world's population - people of 
Africa, Asia and Latin America live in poverty. This poverty 
transcends all boundaries affecting inhabitants of both 
rural and urban areas. 
Living conditions for these people are unacceptably 
deficient. There is a lack of material welfare which is 
astounding, especially for people with the lowest incomes 
[18). Poverty in all its harsh realities prevail. Visible 
companions of mass poverty are continuous - hunger, disease, 
early death and illiteracy. 
The extent of these destitute living conditions en-
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compasses a wide range. Within and between nations it is a 
common occurrence to observe an entire family surviving a 
subsistence level existence. All that is required for 
survival at such a level is both produced and consumed 
by the family unit. It is also possible to observe family 
units who are somehow able to produce beyond that which 
is required for personal consumption, enabling them to 
participate in market activities. 
The possibilities for human progress lie beyond a 
subsistence existence. An exemplification of these possi-
bilities may be found in the structure of coexistence be-
tween the wealthy and the poor of developing countries. 
Though it is hazardous to generalize, it can safely be 
stated that in all countries which make up the developing 
world, an elite class of people exist who are not doomed 
to live a life characterized by squalor and poverty [18]. 
Such patterns of life have existed for hundreds of 
years. Many factors have contributed to perpetuate such a 
state. These factors must be identified and alleviated 
to insure a state of growth, development and equity . We 
must begin to ask questions concerning these conditions. 
How is it possible that obvious affluence can coexist with 
such dire poverty within the same confinement and the same 
city? How can traditional, low productivity, subsistence 
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societies be transformed into modern, high productivity , 
high income nations? We must attempt to discover answers 
to these questions . Though the answers are not obvious 
or simple , they do exist. Proof of their existence lies 
in the existence of the developed world. 
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CHAPTER II. AGRICULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 
The Role of Agriculture in Economic 
Development 
The role of agriculture in economic growth and de-
velopment may be viewed through the impact the green revo-
lution has had on agriculture and subsequent sectors of 
the developing economy. 
The green revolution can be viewed as the application 
of science and technology to traditional agriculture which 
has caused rapid expansion of certain food grains in the 
developing world [38). The initial stage of the green 
revolution began in Southeast Asia during the latter part 
of the 1960s. Many economists now feel a special effort 
must be made to help the rural poor take advantage of the 
potential provided by the green revolution . 
There are two popular interpretations of the green 
revolution. Both of these interpretations have been examined 
by Clifton R. Wharton [38] and Gerald M. Meier [20). Meier 
[20) and others believe that the race between food and 
population is now over. Many other observers believe that 
the very success of the green revolution will produce a 
number of problems. These problems will be more subtle 
and difficult than those faced during the development of 
the new technology . Despite these problems the green 
revolution offers an unparalleled opportunity to break the 
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chains of rural poverty in many parts of the world. 
Success of the green revolution will depend upon how well 
the opportunity is handled and how alert we are to the 
inherent consequences . 
Wharton [38] believes it will not be easy to achieve the 
potential increased production offered by this new tech-
nology . Problems of this achievement are complicated by 
the fact that millions of diverse farms and farmers are 
scattered over the countryside . Increased production will 
automatically produce a whole new set of second-generation 
problems which must b e faced if development is to be sus -
tained and acce l erated. Wharton (38] suggests that two con-
siderations must be borne in mind. First, experience has 
shown that the further spread of new varieties will not be 
as fast as early successes might suggest . Second , the new 
problems arising from the spread of the new technology 
need to be foreseen and acted upon now. 
Both Wharton (38] and Meier (20] agree upon the reasons for 
believing that the new technology will not spread as 
widely or rapidly as supposed . One such reason is the 
shortage of available irrigated land . This shortage im-
poses a short-run limit to the spread of the new high-yield 
varieties . Most of these varieties require irrigation and 
careful water control throughout the growing cycle . The 
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speed with which additional land can be converted to the 
new technology depends upon the rapidity with which new 
irrigation facilities can be constructed. High factor 
costs are likely to be a retarding factor here (38]. 
Significant additional cost is involved in converting 
existing irrigation systems to the requirements of modern 
agriculture. Many of the old gravity irrigation systems 
were not designed to provide sophisticated water controls 
demanded by the new varieties. Meier [20], suggests 
that the green revolution will require heavy government 
investment in irrigation facilities. He further suggests 
that radical changes in cropping and harvesting patterns 
must occur to meet the cost of irrigation works. 
The rapidity with which the new technology will be 
adopted is likely to be much slower where the crop i s a 
basic food staple, grown by a farmer for family consump-
tion . Such farmers are reluctant to experiment with the 
survival of their families. Spectacular results have been 
achieved primarily among the large commercial farmers. 
Farmers must learn new farming skills and develop a greater 
expertise than required in traditional methods of culti-
vation. The new agronomic requirements are quite dif-
ferent in respect to planting dates and planting depths; 
insecticide, pesticide, and fungicide applications . 
Unless appropriate extension measures are taken to educate 
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farmers regarding the new farming complexities, the higher 
yields will not be obtained (38). The rate at which the new 
technology will be adopted is also affected by multiple 
cropping patterns. Many of the new varieties are non-
photosensi ti ve and t he shorter term will allow two or three 
crops per year instead of one. Multiple cropping is good. 
However, many problems may occur as a result. Difficurties 
may arise if new harvests come during rainy seasons with-
ou t provision having been made for mechanical drying of the 
crop to replace the traditional sun drying. Meier [20) also 
suggests that the problem of multiple cropping is compli-
cated by a transportation bottleneck. This term is used 
to identify the problem of transporting grains from the 
agricultural sect or to various destinations . 
From the problems discussed above, it may be deduced 
that the early adopters of the new technology will be in 
regions which are more advanced , literate, responsive 
and progressive. These areas may also have better soil, 
better water management and close access to roads and 
markets. Early adopters will be the wealthier , more modern 
farmers [ 38). There are less economically rational reasons 
why bigger farms may do better . Bigger farms may be better 
placed to obtain subsidized loans or scarce foreign 
exchange to buy capital equipment . The larger farms may 
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also be able to use their influence to get a larger share 
of any available public services. An effect commonly 
observed is that larger farmers are encouraged to use 
excessively mechanized methods of farming which waste 
scarce capital resources and result in too low employment 
[ 2 0] • 
If it is assumed that the new varieties will continue 
to live up to expectations and spread rapidly, the increased 
production will lead to a new set of difficulties . Large 
tracts of land planted in one of the new varieties may be 
susceptible to disease infestation which could result in 
massive losses. Prior to the green revolution, reliance 
upon seed selected by individual farmers meant that neigh-
boring farms growing the same crops usually planted 
two or more different varieties or strains. Such homogeneity 
provided a built-in protection against widespread plant 
diseases, since not all varieties are equally susceptible. 
But when a single variety is produced, covering large 
areas , the dangers of pathologic susceptibility are multi-
plied [ 38] . Wharton [ 38] suggests that two steps are necessary 
to avoid these dangers. First, a diversified breeding 
program which can continually produce new varieties is 
needed. There should also be an able a nd well-organized 
p l ant protection service which can quickly identify 
dangerous outbreaks a nd initiate steps to combat them. 
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Second, it is also important to expand the entire complex 
of services and industries required to achieve the higher 
production. Some related industries which must develop 
if the green revolution is to succeed are seed industries, 
agricultural chemical plants and storage firms. 
Equally important are the increased f arrn services 
which are required, particularly agricultural credit. 
Although yields may increase substantially as a result of 
the green revolution, the farmer must have access to 
substantially greater credit to finance his operations . 
This is particularly true for the poor farmer with low 
cash reserves who may want to adopt the new varieties. 
The village moneylender and merchant will not be adequate 
unless they have access to additional funds. The green 
revolution must be accompanied by an increase in the amount 
of credit available and by the expansion and modernization 
of credit institutions (38). 
The green revolution requires large amounts of new 
investment from both private and public sectors. Its 
momentum is only maintained by policies which increase 
the total amount of capital allocated to investment. These 
resources may be supplied by domestic or external sources. 
Policies providing loanable funds at low rates of interest 
may not be the best method of providing cheap loans to 
farmers. This policy has been tried in various countries 
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with bad results . Farmers able to obtain loans were 
tempted to employ capital-intensive methods of production 
using too little labor. By keeping the interest rate below 
the level which equates demand and supply, excess demand 
for credit is generated. Thus, the government must take 
a greater role in rationing loans among borrowers. 
Domestic financing of the gre en revolution is more 
effective by keeping real rate of interest at levels which 
equate demand and supply for loans. Freebairn [12] 
has observed that two important factors are at work which 
tend to limit the expansion of credit for small farmers. 
The first is the cost of the credit. Increased administra-
tion costs per dollar loaned and the increased risks 
associated with small loans make the costs of supplying 
credit to small farmers higher than to larger farmers . 
Since interest rates for institutional lenders are 
either fixed by law or custom, the extra costs bite into 
profits . Because the total amount of funds available for 
lending is always specified, managers operate more profit-
ably selecting larger farmers who can both borrow in 
larger units and who offer lower risks of losses. The 
second factor centers on the structure of credit insti-
tutions. Commercial banks, cooperative credit societies, 
and public agricultural banks are linked to that segment 
of the rural society that has access to the networks of 
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technical knowledge and physical resources [12). 
There are also doubts about the ability of existing 
markets to handle the increased product resulting from the 
green revolution. More attention must be devoted to 
marketing the increased output. Where there has been semi -
subsistence agriculture, the impact of the new technology 
upon the marketed product is even greater than on total 
production. The impact of this increased production upon 
the traditional marketing network can be disastrous [38). 
For organizational efficiency within the marketing 
network , traders and middlemen should be allowed to freely 
perform their functions to the fullest extent . This idea 
has been strengthened by the agri-business experiments. 
There have, however, been difficulties in utilizing agri-
business organizations . Most notably, local traders per-
form retail distribution of inputs to farmers more cheaply 
than large foreign companies. 
Agricultural Development Strategies: Bimodal 
vs. Unimodal 
Agricultural development may be achieved t hrough a 
variety of strategies , each having different objectives 
and goals. However , it is desirable to implement agri-
cultural strategies which are efficient in terms of a number 
of objectives . It is useful to assess the total efficiency 
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of alternative agricultural strategies in terms of their 
relative success in achieving the following objectives 
[ 2 0] • 
1. Contributing to the rate of economic growth and 
the process of structural transformation. 
2. Achieving a satisfactory rate of increase in farm 
output at a minimum cost. 
3. Achieving a broadly based improvement in the 
welfare of the rural population. 
4. Facilitating the process of social modernization. 
The most fundamental issue of agricultural strategy 
faced by the late developing countries is to choose between 
a bimodal strategy or a unimodal strategy. Implementation 
of the bimodal strategy would seem to imply that the agri-
cultural sector would develop disproportionately. Alterna-
tively, a unimodal strategy seeks to encourage a more pro-
gressive development and a wider diffusion of technical 
innovations adapted to the factor proportions of the 
agricultural sector as a whole. 
The essential distinction between the two approaches 
is that the unimodal strategy emphasizes sequences of 
innovations that are highly divisible and neutral of 
scale. Unimodal strategies may be used efficiently by 
small-scale farmers and adopted progressively . This 
approach does not imply that all farmers or agricultural 
regions will adopt innovations and expand output at uniform 
rates. It does mean that the type of innovations emphasized 
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are appropriate to a progressive pattern of adoption in 
a two- fold sense. There will be progressive diffusion of 
innovations within particular areas. These will also be an 
extension of the benefits of technical change to new 
areas as changes in environmental conditions or improved 
market opportunities enable farmers in new areas to 
participate in the process of modernization. Although a 
bimodal strategy entails a more rapid adoption of a wider 
range of modern technologies, this is necessarily confined 
to a small fraction of farm units. Such confinement is 
due to the structure of economies in which commercial demand 
is small in relation to a farm's labor source [20]. 
Meier [20] suggests that under a bimodal strategy, firms 
which have high capital to labor ratios would account for 
the bul k of commercial production. They would have the 
cash income required to make extensive use of purchased 
inputs. A concentration of resources within a sub-sector 
of agriculture implies a reduction in the ability of farm 
households outside that sub-sector to adopt new purchased 
inputs and technology. 
Under the bimodal strategy, the divergence between 
factor intensities and the technical efficiency of many 
firms may become progressively greater as agricultural 
transformation takes place. Both the initial and subse-
quent divergences between the technologies used in the 
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two sectors may be accentuated because factor prices faced 
by the modern sector in developing countries typically 
diverge from the social opportunity cost. This divergence 
is obvious when subsidized credit is made available on a 
rationed basis to large farmers and when equipment can be 
imported with a low tariff at an overvalued official 
exchange rate . 
Under the unimodal strategy, most firms in the 
agrarian sector display the same factor intensities. 
Inter-farm differences in performance will be larger. 
This is especially true during transitional periods as 
farmers are learning how to use new inputs efficiently . 
The differences reflected will be in output per unit of 
input rather than major differences in factor proportions. 
It is apparent that the two strategies will have dif-
ferent impacts on many dimensions of economic and social 
change . Meier [20) suggests that the most obvious differences 
will be in the nature of demand for farm inputs . The 
structure of rural demand for consumer goods will be dif-
ferent under a unimodal strategy as compared to a bimodal 
strategy. A major difference in income distribution is to 
be expected due to the likelihood that under a bimodal 
strategy the difficult problem of absorbing a rapidly 
growing labor force into productive employment would be 
made more severe. Under a unimodal strategy , there is a 
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good prospect that the rate of increase in demand for 
labor would be more rapid than the growth of the labor 
force. Under- employment and unemployment would be reduced 
as a result of wider participation of the rural population 
in improved income-earning opportunities. 
Because of their differential effects on the se-
quence of innovations and on rural income distribution, a 
bimodal and a unimodal strategy will differ greatly in 
their aggregate capital and foreign exchange requirements. 
The more capital-intensive bimodal strategy emphasizes 
rapid adoption of mechanical innovations, such as 
tractors along with chemical fertilizers and other inputs 
essential for increasing crop yields. Even if such equipment 
is manufactured locally, the foreign exchange requirements 
for capital equipment and its components are high . Production 
processes also require a high level of technical sophistica-
tion, large plants and capital-intensive technologies (20). 
When the strategies have been implemented , the unimodal 
strategy which emphasizes mechanical innovations of lower 
technical sophistication and foreign exchange content , appears 
to of fer greater promise for the development of local manu-
facturing. This is less demanding in its technical require-
ments and is characterized by lower capital-labor ratios and 
lower foreign exchange content . On the basis of the Japan-
Taiwan experience and an analysis of the nature of the 
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supply response to the two patterns of demand, it is appar~ 
ent that a unimodal strategy will have a more favorable 
impact on the growth of output. This is particularly true 
for the growth of employment in local manufacturing and 
service industries. 
The factor largely determining whether .agricultural 
development will follow a unimodal or bimodal pattern is 
that of relative emphasis. If emphasis is placed upon yield 
increasing innovations, a unimodal strategy will be used. 
Conversely, if emphasis is placed upon labor-saving innova-
tions a bimodal strategy will be utilized. The thrust of 
a unimodal strategy will be to encourage general diffusion of 
yield-increasing innovations and such mechanical innovations 
as are complementary with the new seed fertilizer technology. 
The bimodal strategy emphasizes simultaneous adoption of 
innovations that increase the amount of land which individual 
cultivatorscanefficiently work,in addition to the yield-
increasing innovations emphasized in the unimodal approach. 
Meier points out that for these reasons it is not possible 
for developing countries to P.Ursue the unimodal and bimodal 
options simultaneously. 
The unimodal strategy of agricultural development has 
these important characteristics that the bimodal strategy 
does not: 
\ 
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1. Agricultural output can be increased within the 
unchanged framework of the existing small scale 
farming system. 
2 . The bulk of a nation's farmers may be involved 
in increases in agricultural productivity associated 
with the use of improved varieti es of seeds , 
fertilizers and other inputs . 
3 . Agricultural and industrial development may move 
forward together in a process of simultaneous 
growth. 
The unimodal str ategy appears to be the most viable alterna-
tive as a base for widespread agricultural development [20). 
The Role of Credit in Agricultural 
Development 
Credit has been a prominent feature of strategies 
implemented for the development of the agricultural sector 
of developing countries in recent years. It has been in-
eluded among required ingredients of most strategies. Such 
ingredients have included technical assistance, land reform 
and the provis i o n of i n put and output markets [ 6 ]. 
Some authors have viewed credit as the only means by 
which agricultur al development can be achieved . Alterna-
tively, others see credit as a precondition for agri-
cultural development which will be greatly enhanced when 
combined with other preconditions [6] . 
Agricultural credit will make its contribution to 
economic development by increasing output in farming and its 
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related occupations. Credit will, therefore, support other 
elements in overall development plans. Credit must receive 
support from other areas relating to agriculture from 
other sectors of the developing economy. 
Isolated improvements in agricultural credit will have 
very limited results. Credit alone is not the answer; 
at best it is a necessary key which must be used to open 
doors leading to a better economic future [6]. 
Credit provision means that the control of resources be-
longing to someone else is transferred to the borrower at a 
cost. The resources may have been made available by 
savings, taxation or some other means. Credit creation 
implies that an agency other than the borrower provides the 
funds . 
Credit alone cannot create necessary resources. If 
allocated under proper conditions credit may lead to in-
creased productive powers which provide the means for 
future economic growth. Such a process implies that the 
borrower puts the funds to better use in increasing pro-
duction than the lender could have, and that the borrower 
begins a savings process which can aid in the creation of 
more capital [6]. 
Major determinants of economic growth and development 
are an increase in the rate of capital formation, qualitative 
improvements in the use of capital/labor and increases in the 
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effective supply of labor. The major problem is to initiate 
a breakthrough such that there is more income to provide 
capital necessary to begin this process. Not only does this 
process require an increase in the amount of capital, but it 
also requires that an increasing proportion of a growing 
national income be used for capital [6]. 
Capital refers to real goods such as irrigation systems, 
infrastructure, fertilizers, or financial resources. An in-
crease in the national production of these goods requires more 
financial savings directed to capital formation. Agricultural 
credit systems must be designed to help by increasing money 
savings among rural people and by using them effectively . 
Agricultural credit has, at best, been static in the 
majority of developing countries. At the end of a given 
credit period, the farmer has realized no net increase in 
output, income or assets. Static credit must be converted 
into dynamic credit which improves a farmer's output, income 
and his assets [6]. 
Increases in the quantity of credit will not achieve 
these objectives. Credit is a necessary condition. It is 
not a sufficient one. Credit must be designed to give 
strong incentives to improve farm techniques, institutions 
and changes in attitudes. 
Credit is necessary for the development and improvement 
of the agricultural sector. More specifically, priority should 
23 
be given to small farmers in the agricultural sectors of 
developing countries. Concentration on small farmers 
is inevitable since they constitute the largest body of 
producers and have the highest percentage of underemployed 
labor to be mobilized. Furthermore, a focus on the small 
farmer is more productive in countries where land is be-
coming a scarce resource and labor more abundant. 
A country's overall strategy for agricultural develop-
ment is a composite of substrategies of which credit is a 
vital element. Equitable distribution of credit among both 
small and large farmers would promote a development strategy 
which places emphasis on highly divisible, scale-neutral inno-
vations, the unimodal strategy as such. Such a strategy would 
ensure a more efficient utilization of labor and capital re-
sources. More farmers will be able to expand use of fertili-
zer, seeds and other divisible inputs. The diffusion of 
innovations, greatly enhanced by credit availability, will 
be more broadly based. 
Credit rationing to a small percentage of large farm 
owners concentrate resources and their benefits in the 
hands of a few people. Such concentration severely limits 
the ability of other households to take advantage of 
technological innovations. The bimodal strategy of agri-
cultural development is greatly facilitated by credit 
rationing. Under such a strategy, a small percentage of 
24 
farms become highly modernized, capital-intensive units . Thus, 
modernization of the entire agricultural sector is severely 
hampered. 
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CHAPTER III. RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 
INTERMEDIATORS 
Financial Intermediation 
The financial sector of an economy, which includes all 
intermediators, does matter in economic development . It can 
assist in the breakaway from the repitition of repressed 
economic performance to an accelerated growth (26]. 
Financial intermediation includes all functions per-
formed by both monetary and nonmonetary financial institu-
tions . These f unctions may include saving, investing, fi-
nancial advising , etc . The primary function of the financial 
intermediary is to purchase primary securities from ulti-
mate borrowers a nd to issue indirect debt for the portfolio 
of ultimate lenders (13). Savings mobilization, subsequent 
investment via lending and the extension of credit are 
other functions performed by financial intermediaries in 
developing countries . 
The financial intermediary sector may be categorized 
into two main groups: (a) the monetary system , and (b) 
the nonmonetary system which attracts the savings of surplus 
sectors. The monetary system functions as an intermediary 
by purchasing primary securities and creating money. The 
nonmonetary intermediaries perform only intermediary roles of 
purchasing securities and creating nonmonetary claims on 
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themselves in the form of saving deposits , shares , equities , 
etc . [ 7) . 
The product of intermediation is an indirect financial 
asset coined from underlying primary securities. The 
award of financ i al i n termediation arises from differences 
between the rate of return on primary securities held by 
intermediaries and the interest or dividend rate paid on 
indirect debts . 
Interest of economists in financial structures and de-
velopment evolves from beneficial causal relations which are 
believed to exist between financial development and economic 
growth. 
Two rationalizations exist which correlate financial 
development to economic growth [11). They are: 
(a) financial development will improve the mobilization 
of savings; and 
(b) financial development will improve the allocations 
of investment resources. 
The contributions of financial intermediation to eco-
nomic growth and development in terms of the above stated 
hypothesis , may be observed at two levels. Financial 
intermediation occurs at both macro and micro levels. 
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Financial intermediation - macro level 
Commercial banks, cooperatives and development banks 
comprise complex and sophisticated financial systems that 
extend the range of choices and alternatives available to 
suppliers and demanders of loanable funds. Through in-
creasing the number and variety of savings or uses of funds 
and the techniques and means of raising funds, financial 
systems facilitate the transfer of real resources from lenders 
to borrowers (14). 
The saving-investment process is facilitated by numerous 
institutions that offer savers a variety of substitutes for 
real capital or money, which encourage the flow and diversifi-
cation of saving, . and methods of providing borrowers with 
funds to meet their requirements, thus promoting investment 
spending . 
Production may occur as a result of a self-financing 
process or a completely financed process via intermediation. 
Self-financed production occurs when part of the net output 
is consumed and part is saved. The portion saved is placed 
back into the production process by the producers. The 
portion of output placed back into production constitutes 
net additions to the capital stock. Through self-financed 
production, wealth owners directly utilize capital in the 
production process and earn the capital's marginal product 
(19] • 
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Completely financed production occurs when savings are 
placed in a financial intermediary that invests it with 
deficit units. The financial system achieves a separation 
of the ownership and use of capital. Financial intermediaries 
allocate capital resources to earn an average yield higher 
than under self-finance. Financial intermediaries raise the 
marginal productivity of capital. 
Through the efforts of financial intermediaries, small 
farmer savings may be directed from "nonproductive" assets, 
i.e., gold holdings, money hoarding at home, etc. and 
channeled to more productive activities. Financial inter-
mediaries may gather the available small farmer assets or 
surpluses. Institutional savings are increased through this 
process. As institutional savings increase, investments in 
the economy will subsequently increase, assuming the Keynesian 
macro-economic relationship of Savings = Investment. Given 
this occurrence we may expect increases in GNP and national 
income. 
The transfer of real resources is made possible by a 
flow of funds from lenders through financial intermediaries 
to borrowing or deficit units [4]. The financial system 
can influence capital intensity and output by achieving an 
allocation of capital resources that places any productive 
resources with the most efficient producers. This process 
will alter the aggregate production function of the economy 
[ l 9J • 
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In sununary, an efficient financi a l system will produce 
financial services at low unit financial costs and will tend 
to raise capital intensity. An efficient financial system 
will result in: 
1. a better allocation of investment resources; 
2. an increased desire to hold financial wealth per 
unit of output; and 
3 . a separation of the rate of return on capital earned 
by the firm and the rate of deposit earned by holders 
of financial assets . 
Financial institutions simultaneously accommodate both 
deficit and surplus sectors. 
Financial intermediation - micro level 
Financial intermediaries play a vital role in the 
survival of the farm-cum-household at the micro level. 
Financial constraints are regarded as an important reason for 
small farmers ' low income [11). Lack of credit has made it 
impossible for small farmers to take advantage of techno-
logical achievements. Financial intermediaries enable poorer 
f armers to have access to higher yielding investments that 
were previously dominated by the wealthy. 
Priority attention should be given to small farmers with 
growth potential . Additional resources are greatly needed 
by this target group. Financial credit is the most flexible 
tra nsferable form of economic resource . With cash obtained 
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r hrou gh cred i t , small f a rmers are able t o purchase equipment 
necessary to improve efficiency , thus increasing agri-
cultural output. 
The normal flows of credit through banks and related 
ins titutions have been subject to a number of constraints 
that have effectively excluded most small farmers. Formal 
financial institutions can be a very powerful force in de-
velopmental growth , however , they have concentrated their 
re sources in trade , industry , and large scale agriculture 
(10]. The volume of credit directed away from small farmers 
cause many inefficiencies in their productive activity. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of credit shortage on 
agricultural production . 
Production function: Q = (K,L) Assumptions: L = L 
Q. > 0, i = K,L 
1 
Q .. < 0 for K ~ L 
ll. 
K = K 
K < K 
( 1) 
The smal 1 farmer does not have fixed capital requirements. 
Capital requirements are quite variable depending upon the 
number of household members and productive capacity during 
the previous period. The most essential capital requirement 
is replacement of simple farming utensils . This capital 
requirement equals the credit amount needed at the onset 
of each production period. Formal institutions often do not 
e xtend the full amount of credit requested . The farmer is, 
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therefore, forced to begin production with actual capital 
being less than required capital , i . e . , a capital constraint . 
The objective for the small farmer then becomes: 
Case 1: Constrained capital 
maximize 
PF(K,L)-TC S .t . K = K 
M = PF(K,L) - WL - rK + A[K-K] 
Taking the derivative for each variable, we find: 
K: PFk - r + A 
L : PF1 - W 
illustrated by, 
Fk r + A = F
1 
W MRTS = 
r + >. 
w 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
{ 6) 
The MRTS is not equal to the pr ice ratio s; as a result , 
the c ost minimizing criteria is not satisfied . In this instance 
the farmer is forced to produce inefficiently as a result of 
the capital constraint. Production inefficiency may be illus-
trate d via the cost minimization expansion path , Figure 1 . 
Assuming the farmer wishes to expand his productive 
capacity to five units g iven the capital constaint, the 
farmer must increase units of labor. An increase in labor 
units will have the effect of increasing rather than 
minimizing costs . The farmer will be forced to operate 
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K 
------0=10 
K 
L 
Figure 1 . Expansion path : Case 1 
K 
L 
Figure 2 . Expansion path : Case 2 
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inefficiently at a point not on the given expansion path. 
Small farmers must have access to a greater amount of capital , 
in cash or kind, to facilitate efficient production. 
Alternatively, if capital is not a constraint to pro-
duction , the farmer will be able to expand output efficiently. 
The cost minimization criteria will be fulfilled, Figure 2. 
Case 2: Unconstrained capital 
K: 
L: 
PFk - r 
PF - w 1 
r MRTS = w 
( 7) 
( 8) 
( 9) 
Financ i al intermediation should have more importan t 
effects on resource allocation rather than on the generation 
of savings at the micro level (9). Limited funds available 
in rural areas must be supplemented by those available in 
other areas. It is necessary that additional funds be 
directed to the agricultural sector. Equally important, how-
ever , is efficient allocation of available resources. In-
efficient allocation of financial resources within the agri -
cul tural sector may be illustrated via the Edgeworth Box , 
Figure 3. 
The efficient factor allocations, i.e., thos e which 
res ult in output levels on the production frontier are thos e 
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Figure 3 . Edgeworth 's box: Factor allocation 
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input combinations at which the slopes of the isoquants are 
equal , where Equations 10 and 11 are satisfied . At such 
points , each industry values 
f s fL 
1 w 1 = = 
FL f s r 
k k 
(10) 
f s f L 
1 1 = 
f s f L 
k k 
(11) 
the inputs identically. Point A is representative of in-
efficient allocation of resources between large and small 
farmers . From the above illustration we may deduce that 
large farmer production is capital-intensive whereas small 
farmer production is labor-intensive. We see from this 
ana lysis that small farmers in developing countries indeed 
operate with a capital constraint as presented in Case 1 . 
Only through exchange will factors be allocated such 
that each group of farmers will produce on the contract 
curve. Movement to this efficient locus must be accomplished 
through the redistribution of capital to small farmers and 
more labor units to the large farmer. Through such move-
ment, the production level of each group will increase. The 
capital constraint for the small farmer of Case 1 will be 
eliminated as K tends to K - the desired level of capital . 
Production facilitation is the most crucial role 
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financial intermediaries can play. Nevertheless , however 
important this role may be, it is not the only function of 
financial intermediaries . Financial intermediaries may 
strongly influence a sset ownership and income distribution. 
Only borrowers can receive the productive benefits from loan 
use, or realize any benefits associated with loan default . 
If formal loans are concentrated in the hands of a few 
people, benefits will be similarly concentrated [l]. 
Financial intermediaries may also play a role in in-
fluencing household a ctivities not directly related to agri-
cultural production. For example, many households use the 
additional liquidity provided by loans to stabilize cash 
flows and household consumption . Economic activities in 
the borrowing household may be augmented through additional 
liquidity . Such activities include consumption , farm invest-
ment , nonfarm investment, purchase o f consumer durables and 
informal lending [36). 
Proble ms of Rural Fi na ncial 
Markets 
Rural financial markets are complex and subject to mis -
understanding . However, several problems associated with 
RFMs in developing countries have been identified . 
Unclear role of credit : Financial services and credit 
supplies are often created in advance of the demand for them. 
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This approach to credit availability is known as the 
"supply-leading" approach. Alternatively, the "dernand-
leading " approach allows for the creation of financial 
institutions and related services in response to demand by 
savers and investors. Institutions may then be developed 
or modified as demand necessitates [24). 
Credit provision to farmers does not insure rapid 
adoption of technology. Other factors tend to be as im-
portant as credit availability. Such factors include riski-
ness and profitability. In situations where technology meets 
these conditions , credit may facilitate its rapid adoption 
[ 31) . 
It has been suggested that credit programs should not 
finance other than productive activities. Extension of 
credit for consumption purposes would, therefore, be excluded . 
Small farmers are characterized by a subsistence quality . 
Consequently, it is difficult to distinguish between credit 
demand for consumption or production purposes . There may 
exist a very serious dichotomy for the role of credit as 
viewed by the borrower and the lender (31) . 
Institutional credit programs often result in a substi-
tution for the farmers' own income or for credit from other 
sources [lOJ. 
Limited coverage: A small percentage of the rural 
population have access to formal financial institutions. 
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Limited coverage of the rural poor may be directly linked to 
RFM policies . Preferential rates of interest clearly illus-
trate this point . Low rates of interest have resulted in 
little credit reaching small farmers. Concentrations of 
income and asset ownership among large farmers have resulted. 
Low rates of interest have not been sufficient to cover loan 
administration costs which results in a tendency for institu-
tions to make fewer and larger loans (10, 31) . 
One method of al l eviating this problem would be to allow 
market or competitive rates of interest to prevail (10, 31] . 
"Rising rates of interest will not automatically result in 
greater small farmer access to agricultural credit" (31, p. 8) · 
Before greater small farmer access to agricultural credit 
can be achieved , many other institution rigidities must be 
overcome . 
Fragmented financial markets: Financial markets are 
fragmented when firms and/or households experience different 
prices for land , labor and capital. Fragmentation also occurs 
when firms and/or households face different prices for com-
modities produced . 
Rural financial markets are heavily fragmented in 
relation to formal and informal credit markets . Within these 
two capital markets there exist sub-markets with differential 
rates of interest for credit and savings (31] . 
Necessary changes must occur as a result of integrated 
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capital markets which mobilize rural savings and inte-
grates RFMs with national markets. Such integration will 
allow for movement of fund s i n to and out of the rural 
sector. Not only must financial markets be integrated, but 
financial instituti ons must be designed to ensure small 
farmer access to credit (31) . 
Obstacles to Financial 
Reform 
International lending agencies are becoming increasingly 
aware that many projects they support, have been less than 
successful. However, any attempts at financial reformation 
meet firm opposition in developing countries (32) . Argu-
ments against f i nancial reform are outlined below . 
Officials of developing countries fear that financial 
reform will ultimately lead to bankruptcy of many financial 
institutions . The key element to financial reform is to 
raise interes t rates to leve l s comparable to those determined 
in a competitive market [10 , 31 , 37). Most financial insti-
tutions function as issuers of short-term liabilities such 
as demand and savings deposits. If interest rates are to 
be raised substantially , such financial institutions will 
encounter serious difficulties . They will be forced to pay 
higher rates of interest on short-term liabilities while 
being unable to charge higher rates on long term loans. Thus, 
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financial institutions face substantial losses [37). 
Possible solutions to this problem include a program 
of government loans which would yield aid to financial 
institutions facing bankruptcy. Alternatively, a tax-
subsidy program would transfer resources from various other 
sectors of the economy to such financial institutions. 
Particularly interesting, is a tax program which allows for 
the raising of interest rates on outstanding loans (37). 
A low rate of interest is only one of many distortions 
present in the economy of developing countries . Distortions 
in other markets may be as serious as that of interest rates 
in the financial market. A possible, though improbable, 
solution would be to enact a reform program covering a ll 
aspects of the economy [37]. 
Lender characteristics: 
Informal/Formal 
The availability of credit to small farmers in de-
veloping countries is a major determinant of the rate of 
development of the agricultural sector. There exist two 
financial markets which supply credit to farmers in developing 
countries . One such financial market is comprised of all 
institutional or formal lenders. Formal lending institutions 
may include development banks, cooperatives , and commercial 
banks. The informal financial market is composed of traders, 
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telalives , indigenous Ldnks , money l enders, shopkeepers and 
landlords . 
Each financial market performs valuable functions and 
has associated with it advantages and disadvantages. 
Informal Financial Markets 
The informal financial market is characterized by 
localized transactions of money and real goods and services. 
These transactions are conducted between friends, neighbors, 
relatives, landlords and commercial money lenders. General-
ly , conventional collateral will not be required to obtain a 
loan . However , the lender may hold an informal mortgage on 
the borrower ' s land , or there may exist an agreement that 
the borrower's crop will be sold to the lender. 
Informal credit supplies operate in a static, low pro-
ductivity economy. These markets are often small in 
geographical scale and are located in rural areas of develop-
ing countries . Through such operations, informal lenders 
reveal entrepreneurship in their willingness to undertake 
crucial risks of credit business. 
The informal lender will supply credit for use in 
production, consumption or social ceremonies. All loans 
are granted on a short term basis for a period of one 
yPar or less. During this period, interest rates may vary 
between 20 percent and 100 percent annually [lOJ. 
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High interest rate causes 
Many explanations have been offered for the high rates 
of interest which prevail in the informal market. One 
theory is that i n terest rates are high because they have 
been determined by custom and have always been high [16) . 
The theory of the "customary interest rate" is not a satis-
factory theory. It does not explain how or why the high 
interest rate developed. The true explanation must then be 
found in socio-economic conditions of developing countries 
which cause the demand for loanable funds to be large in 
relation to the supply of such funds . 
Some theories explain high interest rates in terms of 
demand factors while others emphasize supply factors . 
Demand for funds/capital may be large because the average 
borrower in the informal market has a very low income which 
results in no surplus available to finance future business 
operations. On the supply side , there is a general shortage 
of capital in developing countries resulting from an in-
adequate level of domestic savings. The small amount of 
savings, which does exist , is not channeled effectively into 
the informal market because of t he absence of proper financial 
and credit institutions. 
High rates of interest are often justified on the basis 
of loan size . Loans in the informal market are usually 
small in size and cause fixed handling charges to be 
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relatively high. 
The disproportionately large demand for loanable funds 
coupled with an inelastic and limited supply of funds may 
be another cause of high interest rates. 
Several causes of limited capital supply are suggested. 
The primary source of capital is the commercial money-
lender who will only lend at rates comparable with what could 
be earned by employing capital in alternative uses. These 
moneylenders do not have the facilities necessary for 
mobilizing liquid funds, therefore supply tends to be in-
flexible. Because the informal market is not closely con-
nected with the formal market, there is little possibility 
of increasing the supply of loanable funds beyond the 
savings of the lending sector of the informal market . 
Divisions of the informal market 
Several d i visions of the informal market in developing 
countries may be observed. One division observed is where the 
supply of capital is dominated by indigenous bankers and 
other institutions. Demand is dominated by rural traders and 
medium-sized landlords . 
Demand may also originate primarily from small agri-
culturalists with good credit ratings whose capital needs 
are fulfilled by money lenders, traders, and landlords at 
high but reasonable rates of interest. 
• 
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Alternatively, demand may originate from borrowers who 
are not good credit risks and who do not have suitable 
collateral. Such borrowers are only granted loans by 
informal lenders under conditions which attach exhorbitant 
rates of interest. 
Advantages vs . disadvantages of informal lending 
Though the rates of interest in informal markets are 
quite high, the availability of informal credit has 
associated with it many advantages that cannot be dis-
regarded. 
The availability of informal credit eliminates many 
hidden costs associated with obtaining institutional credit . 
Formal lending institutions are generally located in urban 
centers. In an attempt to obtain institutional credit, the 
farmer must incur expenses associated with travel from rural 
to urban centers. 
During the period he is applying for institutional credit, 
the farmer must allocate time away from farming activities. 
In situations where the farmer must continuously travel to the 
location of credit institutions, the production level of the 
farm may decrease significantly. The opportunity cost of 
obtaining institutional credit under such conditions is too 
great f or many small farmers to incur. 
In addition , the farmer must bear the entire cost of all 
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paperwork associated with processing the loan. The farmer 
will incur these costs regardless of whether he acquires 
the loan or not. In the event the farmer does not acquire 
the loan, he has suffered great expense without gaining any 
benefit. In most instances rural financial markets are not 
well- developed and a great deal of red tape exists in 
processing loans. Costs associated with all paperwork may be 
quite high. 
The existence of hidden costs primarily affects the 
owners of small farms whose level of productivity is low. In 
many instances, small farmers will forego any attempt to 
acquire institutional credit due to the existence of these 
costs . 
Commercial informal credit suppliers may also provide 
additional services that are vital to the survival of 
small farmers . Shopkeepers often provide farmers with 
a marketing network for any produce their farm may yield . 
Commercial informal lenders also make available necessary 
inputs of production . 
Informal credit suppliers are able to adjust the 
terms of their loans to reflect the costs and risks 
peculiar to the loan situation (10]. In countries where 
usury laws exist, informal lenders manage to freely adjust 
interest rates charged on different loans. Farmers who 
borrow from moneylenders lack alternative sources of funds 
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(there are usually several moneylenders per geographical 
area}. This situation represents a segmented informal 
supply market. The lack of information from the demand 
aspect tends to create and mainta i n differential rates 
of interest among informal lenders and for the same lender 
[l 0] . 
The informal lending market provides valuable services 
to small farmers in developing countries. However, due 
to the nature of informal market characteristics, there are 
many disadvantages associated with the acquisition of in-
formal credit. 
"Once credit is granted, there is usually no further 
contact between the informal lender and borrower until 
time of repayment [10, p. 87). The use of funds by the 
farmer is completely unsupervised. The farmer receives 
no technical assistance. There exist no development 
goals which attempt to achieve the economic improvement 
of the farmer. 
It is possible for a farmer to lose ownership of his 
farm to a commercial moneylender. This occurrence is 
the end result of a process of continuous extension of 
loans, higher interest rates and continuous purchases of 
consumption and production goods from the shopkeeper-cum-
moneylender. 
The most common disadvantages cited are the monopoly 
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elements possessed by the moneylender. Unusually high 
rates of interest on small loans are an exemplification of 
these monopoly elements. Interest rates may vary from 20 
percent to one hundred percent annually [9, 10]. A number 
of economist suggest the moneylender is extracting un-
justifiably large profits from poor farmers by his 
monopolistic powers. Alternatively, others believe that 
the moneylender's income is justified by the costs and 
risks of lending, and that monopoly elements do not exist 
( 10] . 
Interest rates charged by commercial moneylenders 
do suggest a prevalence of monopoly profit in informal 
lending. It is unreasonable to suggest that the costs of 
administering informal loans justify these high rates of 
interest. Informal lenders enjoy many cost advantages in 
administering loans. However, consideration must be 
given to the impact of default and risk elements involved 
in each loan granted. "Some economists emphasize the 
hazards of weather and prices for agricultural incomes, 
and the resulting risks faced by moneylenders whose in-
comes are closely tied to those of their small farmer 
clients" [10, p . 89] . 
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Regulation of moneylenders 
If monopoly profit does exist , it is considered un-
desirable. Many developing countries have attempted to 
eradicate high interest rates charged by commercial money-
lenders . Several countries have implemented usury laws 
setting maximum interest rates . The effectiveness of 
usury laws has been minimal . Usury laws have been un-
enforceable in many rural financial markets due to the 
dichotomous nature of the markets. Moneylenders are adept 
at circumventing usury laws because of the existence of 
imperfect knowledge both from the demand and supply side. 
It has been suggested that moneylenders be regulated 
using the following guidelines: [S] 
1. registration and licensing , 
2 . maintenance of accounts in a prescribed form, 
3. interest rate control, 
4. periodic statement of accounts to debtors, and 
5. issue of receipts to debtors. 
The regulation of commercial moneylenders according to the 
above guidelines is good in theory. It must be recognized 
tha t moneylenders are generally illiterate and cannot 
successfully fulfill many of the guidelines . Regulation 
of moneylenders may also be ineffective as a result of 
borrower behavior. The borrower will not assert his rights 
through the courts for fear of deprivation of future 
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credit. These factors make the regulation of money lenders 
highly improbable [5]. 
An alternative approach to the reduction of money-
lender interest rates is the integration of existing 
capital markets [5 , 10] . An institution designed to pro-
vide credit while taking advantage of moneylender services 
would be of great value to small farmers. Such an organiza-
tion would not only provide credit but also marketing, 
supervision, and information to the farmer. 
Programs designed for reducing high interest rates 
must be guided by the principal that interest rates can 
be lowered only by reducing the demand for loanable funds 
as well as by increasing the supply of such funds [10]. 
The demand for loanable funds for consumer expendi-
tures can be reduced by changing social habits and con-
cepts of well - being. Reduction in borrowing for productive 
purposes is not desirable. Such borrowing can only be 
reduced in the long run through savings increases resulting 
from higher agricultural output and income . 
Alternatively, an increase in the supply of loanable 
funds may be effective in the reduction of interest rates. 
Capital supplies should be increased such that legitimate 
credit needs are met at cheaper rates of interest. 
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Lender/mobilizer 
Informal sources of credit are not limited to the 
local moneylender. In many developing countries informal 
credit-savings associations exist. These rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCA) provide valuable 
services to rural households and enterprises . ROSCA are 
informal, indigenous savings and credit societies which 
a re common in developing countries and have a high 
participation rate among rural people [4). In its simplest 
form, a group of people meet regularly to make fixed 
contributions of money or goods . The total collected at 
each meeting is distributed to one of the members. Eventual-
ly, all members get their turn to receive the meeting 's 
collection. Recipients may be selected by drawing lots, 
or making competitive bids based on the value to them of 
getting the money at once rather than waiting . 
It is possible for a rotating credit society to 
transform itself into a more conventional credit agency , 
in principle , if the member ' s contributions were not fully 
distributed to members or managers . Contributions may be 
allowed to accumulate for a period of time and then used 
for loans or for community investments. 
The popularity of ROSCA is attributed to five favorable 
features : accessibility, simple procedures , flexibility , 
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adaptability, and the provision of f inancial as well as 
social and economic services. The ROSCA appear to satisfy 
financial needs which formal lenders are not satisfying. 
ROSCA play a useful role in the provision of credit 
by providing participants large sums of money needed to 
meet household or farm needs. The rotating credit society 
is a device which can mobilize traditional social relation-
ships to fulfill nontraditional economic functions. It is 
an intermediate institution which aids in harmonizing the 
agrar ian social structure with modernist commercial pat-
terns of behavior (10] . 
Formal Financial Markets 
While informal sources of credit have played a vital 
role in the survival of small farm owners, formal sources 
have contributed much less . The minor contributions of 
formal institutions to the small farm owner are a result 
of institutional policies and behavior. 
The dissemination of credit on a wide scale basis, 
to rural inhabitants , has been the objective of agri-
cultural credit programs. Such programs have attempted 
to achieve this objective through previously established 
institutions such as private and state commercial banks. 
The success of such programs has been minimal . 
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Characteristics of formal financial market 
Financial institutions in rural financial markets 
share similar characteristics and banking practices. 
Many of those characteristics and banking practices dis-
suade small farmers from attempts to acquire institutional 
credit . 
Application forms: Small farmers regard application 
forms with some degree of hostility. The majority of 
small farmers are illiterate and cannot be sure what is 
being said in writing. The relationship of the small 
farmer with the village moneylender does not exist and 
cannot be transferred to larger credit institutions. The 
loan officer must attempt to acquire vital information that 
can be checked from records. Credit agencies must also 
collect information regarding a farmer's operations to 
determine what is appropriate for his needs [10) . 
A major reason for the elaboration of informational re-
quirement is the effort to judge credit worthiness of 
loan applicants. It is understandable that institutions 
would be anxious regarding loan default. However, basic 
questions must be answered. Are repayment probabilities re-
lated to the kinds of data farmers must supply? Are 
f armers with bank accounts more reliable in repayment than 
those who have none? Each of these issues must be closely 
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examined to determine the necessity of extensive loan 
application forms . If an institution has mixed clientele 
of borrowers, it may be appropriate to use long forms for 
large borrowers and a more simplified form for small 
borrowers [10] . 
Security requirements: It is a common practice to 
require farmers to own property in order to qualify for a 
loan . The kind of property which is pertinent is usually 
land . Land may be involved in the loan procedure as a 
form of collateral. A borrower's possession of useful 
collateral insures the lending institution will receive 
some return on extended credit should default occur . Some 
agencies do not make collateral an explicit condition for 
lending. However, it may have a formal or informal re-
quirement that borrowers be property owners and that they 
be able to prove it. 
Collateral provides insurance for urban banks against 
failure to collect debts. A merchant may assign some 
portion of his inventory as collateral . In the event the 
merchant does not repay the loan, the bank may take 
possession of the alloted inventory and sell it to 
merchants in a similar business. Financial assets such as 
bonds or notes may be taken over by banks in a similar 
manner . The asset that rural borrowers usually possess 
is land. The value of agricultural land to banking 
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institutions is questionable. Developing countries do 
not have an active market in the sale of rural land. 
Banks may acquire land they cannot easily dispose of. Even 
though a plot of land may be a good agricultural asset, it 
may be a poor bank asset [10]. 
Conunon problems of formal financial institutions 
Financial institutions in rural financial markets 
(RFMs) tend to encounter similar problems. This phenomenon 
occurs because many countries have built their rural fi-
nancial markets on similar assumptions. Problems en-
countered by rural financial markets may be termed "manage-
ment and training difficulties" and "unsatisfactory per-
formance of RFMs". 
Management and training difficulties occur due to a 
shortage of trained personnel to fill available positions 
in financial institutions. Examples of problems attributed 
to management and training difficulties are high cost 
lending operations, data processing problems , and slowness 
in making loan decisions. As financial markets continue 
to develop, these problems are eliminated [lJ. 
The second group of problems, unsatisfactory per-
formance of RFMs, are relatively more important and more 
difficult to alleviate. Features of the unsatisfactory 
performance of RFMs are outlined below [l] . 
SS 
A. Government difficulty in maintaining purchasing 
power of formal agricultural credit portfolio. 
B . Major loan repayment problems . 
c. Shortage of funds made available for agricultural 
loans. 
D. Insufficient amounts of medium- and long- term 
loans . 
E . Ineffectiveness in mobilizing voluntary savings. 
F. Excessive fragmentation of RFMs. 
G. Adverse effect on income distribution and asset 
ownership. 
Institutional suppliers of agricultural credit 
Commercial banks Commercial banks are among the 
important source s of institutional credit for agricultural 
production. The provision of short-term and intermediate 
credit defines the usefulness of commercial banking to 
agricultural production . The terms and conditions on 
which credit for production is advanced may vary greatly . 
The rates of interest charged are directly re l ated to the 
tangibility of security offerings and the cost of making 
loans . 
Commercial banks are financial intermediaries . As 
such , commercial banks may be viewed in the same manner 
as a marketing firm whose primary function is to accumu-
late the funds of savers and distribute loans to borrowers 
at a maximum profit. 
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Commercial banks possess many advantages, most 
particularly in the provision of short-term credit to 
agriculture. They are able to efficiently collect a large 
volume of investible funds that vary greatly in amount 
nnd duration, and are able to make available a flow of 
resources to be used in production . They may advance 
loans in a variety of ways such that the needs of bor-
rowers may be fulfilled while not being constrained by 
the requirements of individual lenders (7). 
Commercial banks may be c hartered by the government 
or a group of individuals. It is most common to find com-
mercial banks that have been chartered by the government 
in developing countries . As such, they are subject to 
strict government regulation. 
Many attempts have been made to direct credit to 
small farm owners in developing countries . Dominant 
among these attempts is the policy of preferential 
interest rates on agricultural loans. Preferential rates 
of interest or concessional interest rates are rates of 
interest that have been artificially set below the 
market determined rate (35). 
Market rates of interest are low because they have 
been artificially maintained at approximately the same 
rates as those charged in countries that have an adequate 
supply of capital . The rates of interest charged have not 
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reflected the opportunity cost of capital in developing 
countries . Supply and demand for formal loans have not 
been equated, resulting in excess demand which requires 
nonprice rationing. Bank interest rates are lower than 
those charged by informal lenders and have failed to cover 
the cost of administering the loan. Bank interest rates 
have prevented formal lenders servicing marginal clients . 
In many developing countries specialized financial insti-
tutions have emerged whose primary function is to s e rvice 
marginal clients. However, these institutions cannot 
function independently . They must be subsidized by 
domestic governments and contributions from developed 
countries to remain viable (35] . 
The experience of extending credit to small farmer s 
via commercial banks has not been successful . Reasons 
for this outcome are outlined below (23]. 
1. It has not been profitable for commercial banks 
to lend to small farmers. The marginal cost of 
making a loan to a small farmer will be higher 
than on large or medium-sized loans. The small 
farmer will generally not be a client of the 
bank which means the bank must gather information 
at a cost. 
2. Commercial farmers have an ingrained bias against 
lending to small farmers. 
3. It is difficult to attract small farmer's to 
commercial banks . Banking is foreign to most 
rural people in developing countries . Rural 
people prefer to deal with moneylenders who under-
stand the small farmer and his particular set of 
problems. 
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Specialized public financial institutions 
Cooperatives "A cooperative society is a form of 
business organization whose membership is restricted to 
those who do business with it. Control is vested in the 
co- operators who derive benefits in proportion to the 
amount of business they transact with the society . A co-
operative may or may not have share capital, which may 
be subscribed either by non-members, but control does not 
depend on the ownership of capital" [7, p. 217]. 
A cooperative credit organization may begin as a 
simple coalition of farmers within rural areas . These 
organizations may evolve into a unit that is more complex 
in structure and function. Small farmers may be help -
less as individuals but as a group they have the potential 
to become strong and viable . Cooperative credit organiza-
tions may also be formed via government promotion. 
Generation of credit for small farmers at reasonable 
rates is the primary goal of any credit cooperative. All 
members of the cooperative must deposit an agreed upon 
amount of money that will earn a low interest rate . 
Borrowers of money are charged a somewhat higher interest 
rate. Farmers who borrow money must repay it. To become 
affective and maintain its viability, a cooperative must 
have good business management [28]. 
Credit cooperatives that have been established by 
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domestic governments may have a two-tiered or three-tiered 
structure. At the base of every cooperative organization, 
regardless of structure, is a primary society whose function 
is the provision of credit. Credit may be provided ex-
clusively o r in conjunction with other services. At the 
apex of the structure there is usually a cooperative bank 
or similar financing institution. In countries where the 
two-tiered cooperative structure predominates , the primary 
society have direct business links with a branch of the 
apex bank. Alternatively, in countries that have a three-
tiered cooperative structure, a cooperative banking insti-
tution is established at the district level. Credit 
unions that function between the primary societies and the 
apex banks are found in some countries. The main f unction 
of these credit unions relates to scrutiny of loan appli-
cations and assistance in the disbursement of loans and 
collection of payments [27). 
Experience in the promotion of rural cooperatives 
in developing countries has been mixed. There have been 
few successes on a national scale although a number of 
pilot projects have been successful. Many cooperatives 
con tinue to exist but produce much less than was expected 
of them. Many other cooperatives have clearly failed and 
ceased to operate . Efforts to promote cooperatives through-
out the world have ended in partial success or complete 
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failure in terms of fulfilling the objectives of their 
formulation [10]. 
Agricultural credit cooperatives have failed to meet 
their objectives for various reasons. The failure of 
credit cooperatives to maintain their viability may be 
linked to reasons underlying formulation of the organiza-
tion. 
Cooperatives may be formed for politically oriented 
purposes. Governments may attempt to mobilize national 
strength via modernization of a backward society. Though 
economic development may be enhanced under these condi-
tions, it is not the central objective . Cooperatives could 
easily drift into an acceptance of political handouts 
of money without constant concern for maintenance of 
economic viability and agricultural contributions. It is 
possible for cooperatives to become completely subsidized 
by government . Such an event would produce conditions 
where loan repayment obligations were not met and loans 
would be allocated with little regard to productive per-
formance. 
Cooperative groups may be formed to serve as "an 
uplift of backward groups " [10 , p . 193]. Cooperatives 
formed for this purpose are given special privileges of 
low interest loans and allocation of loans to favored groups . 
; . 
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An organization structured for such purposes would create 
activities that would otherwise not exist, nevertheless , 
they have a tendency to be inefficient and unable to 
expand outside of its designated sphere [10). 
Nonpolitical obstacles exist as impediments to the 
progress and success of credit cooperatives. Proper 
management of cooperatives require skills that are foreign 
to small farmers. Farmers must develo p bookkeeping 
skills, accounting methods, technical knowledge and the 
ability to judge the credit worthiness of applicants. 
Lack of credit is the most seve re constaint small 
farmers encounter. It is not the only one, however. 
Ideally, cooperatives should be able to provide exten-
sion services, supply, and marketing networks to farmers . 
Such a multipurpose organization would be able to success-
fully handle the problems of small farmers in an integrated 
manner (10]. 
Development banks A development bank may function 
as an international or global institution, as a regional 
institution, or as an indigenous institution designed 
specifically to aid development in a particular country . 
The purpose for which development banks exist is to 
increase the speed and facilitate the process of economic 
development. The development bank is intended to help 
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stimulate the emergence of missing ingredients necessary 
for development . These ingredients include capital, 
entrepreneurship, technol ogical and managerial capa-
bilities and availability of foreign exchange (17]. 
The World Bank Group is an example of a global insti-
tution. Such institutions have played an important role 
in t h e industrial development of many developing countries. 
Most of their lending has been to banks which have re-lent 
for industrial projects. As a result, there has been a ten-
dency to associate development banking with industrial 
project financing (15]. This image of development banking 
is being dispelled as development banks increase lending 
for agricultural purposes. 
Regional development banks constitute close alterna-
tives to the World Bank Group as sources of multi-lateral 
international development finance for the developing 
countries which are members of them. Regional development 
banks have been designed to give developing countries a 
greater voice in the control of international development 
finance. Developing countries are, thus, provided with 
institutions more responsive to their own aspirations through 
the existence of regional development banks (39]. 
"A regional development bank is one in which the 
demand to serve particular interests is expressed in the 
form of a restriction which explicitly confines operations 
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or e ligibility for me mbership, or which attributes a special 
status within the membership to countries within a limited 
and defined geographical area " [39 , p. 19]. Regional 
multilateral agencies may be distinguished from global 
multi-lateral agencies in the nature of the demand they 
exist to serve . 
The African Development Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank are examples 
of regional development banks. These banks have at least 
two purposes which are common to them all . These are: 
(a) the mobilization of additional external resources and, 
(b) the financing of projects which will contribute to 
the development of individual member countri es and to the 
integrated development of the region as a whole [39]. 
There is no universal model to which indigenous de-
velopment b a nks conform. Each bank is a unique institution 
structured with the political and socio-economic fabric 
of the country in mind. A common dimension of all in-
digenous development banks is their function as a financial 
intermediary supplying medium- and long-term loans to 
economic development projects (17]. Such an institution 
may make funds available for industrial projects and agri-
cultural projects . Development banks must also attempt to 
eliminate certain bottlenecks to economic development by 
providing related supportive services. 
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Sources of institutional funds 
The main sources of commercial bank funds are its own 
equity capital, deposits, and loans from other financial 
and nonfinancial institutions and issues of bonds. 
In the case of commercial banks, deposits from the 
public are the most important source of bank funds . The 
main classes of deposits are: [36] 
1. current or checking accounts which usually 
earn no interest , 
2 . savings accounts, and 
3 . types of term accounts. 
Low nominal rates of interest are usually paid on 
savings and on term accounts. Many developing countries 
experience high rates of inflation. In such instances, 
the real rate paid on savings and term accounts may 
be negative . The real rate of interest is computed using 
the following formula: 
where 
I - o n 
Ir = real interest rate 
o = inflation rate 
In = nominal interest rate 
As noted earlier, agricultural credit cooperatives 
may have a two tiered structure or a three-tiered structure 
consisting of primary societies, secondary or district 
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banks and apex banks. 
The main sources of funds available to apex banks are 
share capital reserves , deposits and borrowings from the 
control bank or government (27). Share capital is the 
bank's main source of capital in the early years . 
Secondary-level or district banks accept current and 
fixed-term deposits from member organizations and from 
public bodies. District banks may also acquire resources 
through borrowings. 
The working capital of a primary society comprises 
owned funds , deposits and borrowings from financial 
institutions or governments. 
Global development banks acquire their funds through 
the contributions of various governments of developed 
countries throughout the world . Aid given to developing 
countries through such an institution is termed multi-
lateral aid. Multilateral aid is a transfer of resources 
where both the collection and the distribution are 
determined by the collective decisions of the group of 
countries involved. The group of countries must include 
more than one such provider of resources and more than 
one net recipient of resources . 
Capital resources of regional development banks in-
clude funds raised by borrowings and funds received in 
repayment of loans and funds given as contributions from 
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the developed world . 
Indigenous development banks are quite diverse in 
nature, however, the genera l characteristics of their 
resource structures are similar. They obtain funds from 
three sources: their own governments, private domestic 
sources and international sources. Although the propor-
tion from each source varies from bank to bank, for the 
group as a whole, government is a net creditor. 
Costs of financial intermediation 
Financial intermediation is not costless. Human and 
material resources are employed in granting and in managing 
loans. Costs of intermediati on are social because the 
resources used for credit could have been utilized to 
increase output elsewhere. The costs are private because 
lenders must compete for these resources in the market [35). 
The costs to the lender include the opportunity 
cost of the funds, costs of administration and losses 
due to default [34]. Administration costs may be divided 
into handling costs and risk-reducing costs . Handling 
costs include cost of paperwork associated with processing 
the loan and costs of loan disbursement. Risk-reducing 
costs a re costs directed at reducing the probability of 
loan default. 
Risk-reducing costs are the largest component of 
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administration costs. More resources can be utilized in 
the evaluatio n and supervision of every borrower and every 
loan. This process enables the bank to select its clients 
more efficiently and reduce its losses from default [36]. 
Risk - reducing activities are expensive and tend to exper-
ience diminishing marginal returns. 
Credit is not a homogeneous product. There are several 
dimensions of credit ; short-term and long-term, large and 
small borrowers . Each of these dimensions is a separate 
product with its own cost function. The costs of lending 
per unit loaned are inversely related to the size of the 
loan. As a result , institutions may be forced to reduce 
the proportion of the portfolio devoted to small farmers . 
The costs of lending are high in the case of agri-
culture due to a lack of expertise of urban financial 
institutions. Costs of lending are particularly high in 
the case of small farmers. Small farmers lack expertise 
in the use of bank services and the costs of collecting 
from them are high. "Also , they usually lack collateral 
and own resources of lower quality" [32 , p. 10). 
Lender costs for institutions extending credit to 
small farmers may be reduced. Credit extension to farmers 
is composed of several stages. Each stage has associated 
with it a cost . 
The loan application stage includes costs of notifying 
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farmers of credit availability, explanations of the pro-
gram and eligibility requirements. Other costs of the 
stage include farmer selection a nd the supplying and 
completion of forms. The largest cost may be decreased 
by simplifying forms and procedures [30). 
Loan evaluation costs include the screening of appli-
cants and conducting appraisal studies. Appraisal studies 
include reviewing farm plans and financial and income 
statements . Ascertaining repayment capacity of the 
borrower and scheduling loan payments constitute portions 
of cost related to loan evaluation . Credit institutions 
generally use forms and procedures for small loans which 
have been applied to medium and large size loans . Such 
practices are inappropriate for small loans. Elimination 
of appraisal study procedures would aid in reducing 
evaluation costs [30]. 
Loan collection costs may be extremely high if farmers 
fail to repay their loans. Where the loan default rate is 
quite high,an institution will experience high administration 
costs in attempts to locate and collect from delinquent 
borrowers [ 30). 
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Institutional behavior 
Institutions providing formal financial services are 
quite diverse in structure. However, most of the organiza-
tions behave very much alike in many respects . Both public 
and private institutions place high priority on maintaining 
viability and self-sustaining capacity. As a result, 
financial institutions are inherent risk averters. 
Financial institutions automatically encounter a 
number of risks unique to the economy it must operate in. 
Not only must the institution bear these risks , but in 
granting loans, it indirectly assumes the risks of its 
clients . The risks associated with small farmers in a 
static , low income economy are great . Small farm owners 
in developing countries must contend with very unstable 
conditions . Farm owners lack technical expertise , adequate 
equipment, and of course financial assistance. Thus, they 
are more subject to crop losses and f a ilure. 
There are many steps institutions may take to lessen 
the probability of loan default by small farmers. Financial 
institutions will generally organize their portfolio in 
such a manner as to direct loans away from the small farm 
owner. It is not uncommon for a financial institution to 
obtain a risky asset if the expected returns on that asset 
exceeds the expected return on a nonrisky asset. In the 
c ase of small farm owners, the expected returns on a 
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loan will be much less than if the loan were directed 
elsewhere. Low expected returns on small farmer loans are 
the result of interest rate restrictions enforced by 
domestic governments. Lenders minimize the costs and 
risks of lending by directing most of their loan funds to 
large experienced borrowers [2]. 
In an attempt to circumvent problems associated with 
lack of technical assistance, institutions may be required 
to provide extension services for farmers. Institutions 
where lenders are required to provide such services 
costs are increased substantially. Lenders are, thus , dis-
couraged from servicing target groups who require super-
vision . 
Financial institutions may also lessen risk through 
collective security methods. Collective security methods 
serve to assign the responsibility of loan repayment to 
more than one person. Methods assuring collective security 
include requiring cosigners for loans, group lending and 
extending loans to small farmers indirectly through coopera-
tive societies. 
Regulation of institutional behavior 
Developing countries have formulated and implemented 
many policies in an attempt to increase the supply of funds 
available to small farmers. The basic notion behind supply 
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increase techniques is that if sufficient funds are in-
jected into rural financial markets, some of it will 
eventually filter down to target groups. Many of these 
policies may, in fact, serve to decrease the flow of funds 
to small farmers. We have shown that this result can occur 
in the case of preferential interest rates. 
Some countries have nationalized part or all of their 
formal rural markets. Attempts have been made to influence 
their performance more directly. Nationalization of 
financial markets does not necessarily have the desired 
effect on lender behavior. It is an easy matter to develop 
regulations for a financial system, but it is difficult to 
enforce these regulations where decision-makers are ad-
versely affected by these policies [l]. 
A number of countries have experimented with loan 
guarantees or crop insurance as a method to alter lender 
behavior . Loan guarantees transfer part of the risks of 
lending to another agency. Crop insurance similarly 
transfers a portion of the risks of farm production to 
another agency. Loan guarantees make lending to small 
farmers more attractive for lenders [29). 
A few countries have used differential reserve re-
quirements as a way to influence the behavior of lenders. 
Reserve requirements may be lowered when a lender behaves 
in a certain manner. Lowering of reserve requirements has 
• 
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the effect of increasing lenders' revenues [l]. 
Supervised Credit 
It has been suggested that a substantial need for new 
credit institutions and expansion of credit is unnecessary 
within the bounds of traditional agriculture. Techno-
logical change which encourages modernization of agri -
cultural production cannot easily replace traditional 
methods of production. Agricultural credit should, there-
fore, accompany agricultural modernization techniques. Such 
techniques may be made available via extension services 
or supervised credit programs (SCP) (34]. 
The purpose of the SCP is to encourage agricultural 
development and production, as well as to increase the 
income of farmers. SCPs have often been regarded as a 
development tool for small agricultural producers. The 
clientele of SCPs are generally agricultural producers who 
are unable to obtain credit from other sources (211. 
Several stages precede approval of a loan application . 
The farmer and credit supervisor must make a farm and home 
plan inclusive of crops and livestock to be raised, input 
and credit requirements , expected income and a schedule 
for repayment. Loans may be extended to finance purchases 
of operating capital, equipment and machiner y , housing 
improvement, livestock and subsistence [21] . 
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Control and direction of production activities are 
exercised through individual credit plans . Cultivation of 
certain crops may be encouraged while others are not 
promoted; loans for certain purposes may be disapproved or 
rejected . Technical assistance regarding new technology 
is provided while loans for various inputs (e . g. seeds, 
fertilizers) may be provided in kind. A farmer is required 
to maintain records and make reports on the progress of 
his operation [21]. 
Supervised credit programs have attempted to attain 
their objectives through improved productivity and crop 
changes. Several advantages are associated with the 
use of SCPs. Credit is provided with the assurance that 
technology required to provide necessary increases in in-
come is available. Also, new technology is sure to be 
accompanied by adequate credit. 
Supervised credit programs make available many vital 
services to the rural poor. There are, however, disad-
vantages in tying credit to other services. SCPs tend to 
concentrate extension services on those farmers who require 
additional credit. This group of farmers is characterized 
by low educational levels, inability to bear risk, and 
less suitability for innovation. 
Loss of supervising credit may be quite high when 
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related to the volume of loans outstanding . This is particu-
larly true when priority is given to small farmers. 
Given the disadvantages and potential problems as-
sociated with SCPs, they do provide necessary services to 
the rural poor and may still remain viable projects through 
careful administration. 
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CHAPTER IV. DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
Credit shortages have traditionally been viewed as 
the greatest deterrent to the growth and development of 
agricultural sectors of developing countries . In recent 
years a pronounced effort has been made to increase credit 
availability to small farmers. A significant increase in 
available credit has resulted from the efforts of both 
domestic governments a nd international development agencies. 
The increased credit supplies have aided in increasing 
agricultural output. However, the proportion of this 
new credit actually reaching the small farmers, who ex-
periences the greatest need, is substantially low. We may 
attribute this phenomenon to many factors, not least among 
them being institutional behavior. We must, however, con-
sider the small farmer and his behavior when actually de-
manding additional credit. 
Factors Affecting Demand 
for Credit 
An increase in credit availability does not automatical -
ly ensure demand by the rural poor. Many factors affect the 
farmer's demand for credit. 
Farm size and output: Farms are generally small , in 
terms of both acreage and output. Agricultural production 
on a small farm is typically labor-intensive , creating a 
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situation in which the value of output per head is small . 
Small farmers have not sought to implement technologically 
advanced methods of farming because they feel such methods 
would be less appropriate than traditional methods. Small 
farms yield very little scope for mechanized farming. As a 
result, the rural poor require little credit while using 
traditional production methods (6). 
Nature of farm enterprise: Developing countries are 
characterized by farms that are more of a socio-economic 
unit and less of a business as compared to developed 
countries. A considerable proportion of production is 
allocated for subsistence level existence, which leaves a 
small proportion available for marketing activities. Small 
farms are usually a family enterprise with little or no 
hired labor. Development requires that an increasing 
proportion of production be sold on the market as a means 
of increasing cash incomes of small farmers. It has been 
suggested that the introduction of a cash crop and an 
adequate marketing network would achieve such an objective 
[ 6) • 
Seasonal rhythm effects: Farmer's incomes are 
constrained by the seasonal nature of farming . Small income 
surpluses result in a low level of cash savings which 
necessitates borrowing to finance consumption. Given a case 
of adequate income throughout the year, farmers will demand 
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medium or long- term credit to provide fixed and semi-fixed 
capital inputs. Credit could be used to introduce addi-
tional crops to increase labor utilization and promote 
growth and continuity of income and to encourage cash 
savings (6). 
Acceptance of new agricultural factors: Profitability 
determines whether farmers will accept a new agricultural 
factor of production. Profitability must exist not only 
in terms of market transactions but also realized in-
creases in the yield of a major subsistence crop. Possi-
bilities of profit increases are more restricted for 
"self-sufficient" farmers than for commercial farmers. 
Determinants of profitability are: (25) 
1 . Price of the factor: Factor prices will be rela-
tively high for rural communities. Companies 
supplying seed, fertilizer and simple machinery 
find costs of entry high relative to the size 
of the market. 
2. Factor yield in rural community: New factors of 
production may be subject to adverse weather 
conditions, insects, etc. Supplies must be 
successful in developing and adapting the new 
factor to the agricultural requirements of the 
community. Risk and uncertainty are inherent in 
the prospective yield of new factors. The true 
yield of a factor may be extremely variable when 
subjected to harsh conditions. 
3 . Farm tenure arrangements: Farm tenure arrange-
ments affect the profitability of a new factor 
to the actual farmer. Costs and returns are 
shared between the land owner and the farmer. 
The actual farmer carries the entire burden of 
additional costs while receiving only a part of 
the additional yield. 
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All of these explanations are at least partially valid 
in many developing countries. However, an even more im-
portant factor affecting farmers' demand for credit may be 
the differences in borrowing costs among formal borrowers. 
Differential borrowing costs affect the willingness of 
small farmers to seek loans from formal lenders. Costs 
associated with borrowing may be expected to be negatively 
related to the demand for credit. 
The price of a loan has been generally related to 
the nominal rate of interest charged on a loan. A more 
realistic "price of credit is the real net costs incurred 
by the borrower in acquiring the loan" (2, p. 166). Bor-
rowing costs may include nominal interest payments made to 
the lender, additional loan transaction costs incurred by 
the borrower and changes in the purchasing power of money 
[ 2] • 
Individuals who do not have prior borrowing experience 
or borrowers of small amounts may incur large transaction 
costs. The types of borrower costs an individual may 
incur are: (1) loan charges paid to the lender such as 
application fees, service fees or bribes. (2) Small 
farmers may be required to negotiate with someone outside 
the lending agency before an application is reviewed, e . g . , 
a cosigner, or extension agent . (3) The most important 
transaction costs often are the borrowers' time and travel 
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expenses [2). 
Variables which affect the demand for credit are defined 
below: [ 22) 
Household consumption: Total household expenses on 
food, housing and clothing. Expenditures on education , 
current debt payments, interest on loans and ceremonies 
are included. 
Cash-on-hand: Cash and near cash at the beginning 
and end of the year. 
Household income: The adjusted net household income. 
Farm income, business income and total receipts from other 
sources are included. 
Investment expenses: All funds spent for the purchasing 
of farm assets. Such expenses include fixed asset purchases 
and liquid asset purchases. 
Assets: The total value of farm assets at the end of 
the year. Land value, changes in the value of land, value 
of buildings, value of machines and value of animals are 
included. 
Hired labor: Total man days of labor hired for agri-
cultural production man days of labor hired for nonagri-
cultural activities are also included. 
Farm output: Total value of agricultural output 
produced on the farm. 
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Total revenue : The revenue from all sources for the 
household. Tota l revenue includes total agricultural re-
ceipts, and receipts from side businesses and other 
sources. 
Interest payments: The total interest payment on 
outstanding debt. 
Cash at the beginning of the year: The amount of 
cash and near cash at the beginning of the year . It may be 
used as a proxy for liquidity. 
Operating expenses: Total agricultural expenses. It 
includes total wages paid, rent expenses , and livestock 
expenses . 
Debt load: The outstanding value of loans from all 
sources at the beginning of the year . 
Loan demand may also be influenced by the farm-house-
hold' s time preference between present and future con-
sumption. Low income farm-households will tend to have 
stronger preferences for present consumption. Consequently, 
demand for loans will be higher such that present consump-
tion may be fi nanced. Time preference may depend on a 
variety of factors, such as real income and expected pattern 
of income flows [8) . 
A conunon problem encountered by all developing coun-
tries is estimation of the demand for credit to be utilized 
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for productive-investment and/or consumption purposes. 
Determination of credit needs is a necessity to the formu -
lation of national development plans and budget require-
ments. 
Factors which affect the demand for credit may be 
identified through various methods. A general survey of 
farmers in a particular area may indicate what criteria 
farmers use in determining whether o r not to apply for 
institutional credit. Cristina David and Richard Meyer 
(8) utilize a conceptua l model rela ting time pre f erence 
of consumption and investment to the existence of perfect 
capital markets. Single equation loan demand models based 
on cross-sectional data are typically used in developing 
countries . Studies conducted by He s ser and Schuh, Pani, 
1966, Pong and Neynin, 1978, as cited in (22) suggest 
several variables have an impact on the demand for credit. 
The variables and their relationshi p to the demand for 
credit by farmers in developing countries are outlined 
below. 
D = Credit demand c Sc = Credit supply 
1 . Household consumption t + cash-on-hand ~ + De+ 
2. Household income t + cash-on-hand t + investment 
expenses t + s t + D + c c 
3. Assets t + investment expenses + + Sc t + Oct 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
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Investment expenses t + S t + D t c c 
Hired labor t + D t c 
Farm output t + cash-on-hand t + assets + + Set 
Total revenue t + cash-on-hand t + assets t + 
S t + D t 
c c 
Interest payments t + D + c 
+ D t c 
9. Cash at the beginning of year t + cash-on-hand t + 
S t + D + c c 
10. Operating expenses t + cash-on-hand + + Dc t 
11. Debt load t + D t c 
The following relationship may therefore be assumed: 
De = f [C,HI,A,IE,HL,FO,TR,IP,CY,OE,DL) 
Table 1 summarizes the studies conducted by Hesser and 
Schuh, and Pani; and outlines their results (22, p. 85) · 
Variables which have the most significant impact on 
the demand for credit were identified as: 
De = f [DL,IE,CY) (see Table 1) 
Loan demand relationships may d i ffer significantly 
between low and high income farmers . Variables which 
have a significant impact on demand for credit have been 
identified as: 
Del = f [TR,DL,C,OE,CY,PUJ (22) 
Factors which affect the demand for credit by high income 
Table 1. Empirical results of selected estimates of linear demand functions 
: or loans based on simultaneous equation models (22) 
Interest Rate 
Internal funds : 
Farm income 
Money balance/gross 
Far m expenses 
Investment opportunities : 
Technology 
Wage rate 
Net capital appreciation 
Hesser 
& 
Schuh 
(1921 - 59) 
- 0 . 90 
(- l . 80)a 
- 1. 99 
(-2.62) 
-3.36 
(-2.90) 
0.91 
(3.07) 
Net farm & nonf arm income 
Others: Lagged credit 
Interest elasticity 
0 . 86 
(3 . 66) 
0.66 
-2.29 
Lins ( 1 9 4 7 - 6 9 ) 
Land Commercial 
bank bank 
- 3.53 
(- 0 . 06) 
- 17.01 
(- 2.54) 
5.05 
(0. 72) 
19 . 84 
(2 . 00) 
0 . 83 
b 
3 . 35 
(0.05) 
- 4.75 
(-0 . 73) 
7.14 
(1.32) 
11.29 
( 1. 34) 
0.64 
b 
aValues in parentheses are t-values. 
Insurance 
- 337 . 23 
( - 4 . 68) 
-36 . 93 
( - 5 . 20 ) 
3 . 99 
(0 . 68) 
22 . 28 
(2.45) 
0.71 
-8 . 37 
Others 
- 17.37 
(- 0 . 12) 
-20 . 00 
( - 1.61 ) 
20 . 45 
(2 .11 ) 
16 . 09 
(0 . 99) 
0 . 82 
bElasticities were not computed because the coefficients were not sig-
nificantly different from zero. 
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farmers have been identified as: 
Dch = f [DL , IE,CY,FU] (22] 
where 
FU = fertilizer used in production. 
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CHAPTER V. INTEREST RATE POLICIES 
Concessional Rates of Interest 
In the institutional markets most loans require that 
the borrower sign a promissory note that often demands a 
co-signer. Many such loans also require a mortgage or 
other real collateral; collateral values may exceed the 
amount loaned . Nominal interest rates, normally subject 
to law or official regulation, may vary from 4 up to about 
25 percent annually, depending in part on the rate of in-
flation in the country. The largest concentration is in 
the 6-12 percentage range . Rates on agricultural loans 
are usually somewhat below the bank rates charged in other 
sectors , and are sometimes less than the annual rise in 
the consumer price index. Most loans are short term but 
some medium and long-term loans up to about eight years 
can be found . Application procedures vary among lenders 
but some form of commercial bank procedure predominates . 
The borrower goes to an off ice and answers questions sub-
mitted by secretaries; he is then filtered through various 
white collar employees and ultimately talks to a loan 
officer or the manager. The borrower must present a 
series of forms , all properly stamped. These forms will 
vary depending on whether this is the first loan he is 
requesting from the institution, whether he is a large or 
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small farmer, and whether he has friends and/or influence 
in the lending institution. In many cases,the borrower is 
asked to come back at a later date to learn the pre-
liminary decisions on the loan application. The farm 
may be subjected to inspection by bank employees to evalu-
ate the property and potential production. 
Many development economists have accepted that the 
performance of rural financial markets {RFMs) in low-income 
countries {LIC) has been poor. This poor performance may 
be explained by looking carefully at the behavior of formal 
financial i nstitutions. In most cases, governments adjust 
financial market policies in order to do something for , 
or to , the ultimate uses of financial services [l]. 
Generally, little attention is given to how financial 
institutions react to these policies; it is assumed they 
simply meet the letter of the law [l] . It is also common 
for governments to force financial institutions to carry 
out activities they are not equipped to handle . 
Well-intended policies such as concessional interest 
rates on loans to small farmers may, in fact, force lenders 
to direct loans away from the desired target group . 
Lenders are forced to direct concessionally priced loans 
away from the small borrowers because expected revenues and 
costs from making these types of loans provide little profit 
incentive to the lender. 
87 
As previously suggested, low interest rates on agri-
cultural credit are often justified on the basis of what 
they do for, or to, the rural poor. Policy-makers often 
overlook the effects which these concessional interest 
rates have on the activities of formal lenders. This is 
surprising once it is recognized that many of the problems 
caused by concessional interest rate policies occur in 
the distortions it causes in lender behavior [l]. 
Costs of loaning and borrowing 
Lenders incur four types of costs in making loans. 
These are: (1) the expense of acquiring the funds which 
are lent, (2) the transaction costs of making and ad-
ministering the loan, (3) the losses incurred when some 
loans are not repaid, and (4) profits or economic 
surpluses needed to pay owners of the financial institu-
tions [l]. When small loans are involved, the loan trans-
action costs are a very important part of the lender's 
total cost considerations. For most formal lenders the 
transaction costs per unit of money lent varies inversely 
with the size of the loan. Lenders do, however, experience 
substantial differences in loan transaction costs between 
loans to customers of long standing and new borrowers . 
It is of ten costly for a lender to assemble sufficient in-
formation to assign a reliable repayment probability to a 
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new borrower. Thus, other things being equal, individual 
loans to the new small borrowers are doubly undesirable 
for most formal lenders [l]. 
Despite the diversity found among the institutions 
providing formal financial services, it appears that most 
of these organizations behave very much alike. Any insti-
tution, public, or private, places high priority on main-
taining its viability and self-sustaining capacity. Over 
time, it must do this by maintaining a good deal of political 
support, and exercising some independence. It is difficult 
for a credit agency to do this if it must return year 
after year to central governments for funds to cover 
operating costs. Even nationalized banks must generate 
economic surpluses. It is for this reason that most formal 
lenders in market economies pay close attention to costs 
and returns from their operation. As suggested earlier, 
most governments closely regulate the interest rates which 
formal lenders may apply to agricultural loans. Noninter-
est charges which lenders can impose on borrowers are also 
regulated in most cases. Thus, as long as these rates are 
binding, formal lenders have little latitude on the 
revenue side to generate economic surpluses [3]. As long 
as the lender keeps his money lent, and expands as rapidly 
as possible the amount of money that can be lent, gross 
revenues are maximized. Lenders must focus on the cost 
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side to influence their profits. 
Where contractural interest rates are kept low and 
inflation is a s erious problem, it is not difficult for 
formal l enders to lend their money . Under these circum-
stances , contractural rates of interest may be less than 
rates of inflation and result in negative real rates of 
interest . For those borrowers who have relatively small 
loan transaction costs , this may result in negative real 
borrowing costs. The effect of these borrowing costs on 
loan demand by small and large borrowers is illustrated 
in Figure 4. As can be noted, negative real borrowing 
costs for large borrowers induce them to operate on a 
portion of their loan demand schedule which is highly 
elastic with respect to borrowing costs (and interest rates). 
If borrowing costs are low enough , the demand among large 
borrowers may be essentially infinite . Under these condi-
tions , borrowing costs stimulate, rather than discourage 
loan demand . Large borrowers receive an implied income 
transfer through the loan transaction. 
Because of the relatively large loan transaction costs, 
these negative real rates of interest have much less 
effect on loan demand among small and new borrowers . These 
loan transaction costs result in annualized borrowing costs 
which are quite high, and force small and new borrowers to 
90 
Annualized Real Borrowing Cost Rate 
New 
or Small Borrower 
Demand 
- --BCs Experienced 
or Large Borrower 
Demand 
Figure 4 . Loan demand by new or small and experienced 
or large borrowers [l) 
91 
operate on inelastic positions of their loan demand schedules. 
Part of these loan transaction costs may be imposed on 
borrowers by formal lenders as a way of discouraging them 
from requesting loans. Under these circumstances, small 
and new borrowers are tepid to indifferent about acquiring 
formal loans while large and experienced borrowers are 
highly enthusiastic. Formal lenders have little diffi-
culty in placing most of their loans in the hands of large 
borrowers who have well-established credit ratings [l) · 
In directing most of their loan funds to large 
experienced borrowers, a lender minimizes the costs of 
lending. Other things being equal, the costs per unit 
of money lent for making a large loan are less expensive 
for a lender to loan a given amount of money to indi-
viduals who have borrowed previously from the lender, than 
it is to deal with new borrowers. Reliable information 
on the credit-worthiness of an individual is costly to 
assemble . 
The differences in the marginal costs for lenders to 
extend large versus small loans are illustrated in Figure 
5 . As shown there, a formal lender may be able to extend 
OQl amounts of loans to large borrowers at marginal costs 
lower than it can make any loan to small borrowers. Only 
when loanable funds exceed OQl will the lender choose to 
extend some loans to small borrowers. If AlQ2 loanable 
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______________________ .._ ...... ..._ ________________________ Q 
Al 0 Q1 
Figure 5 , Marginal costs of making loans to small and 
large borrowers [l] 
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funds are available, only AlO will be directed to small 
borrowers, while OQ2 will go to large borrowers. In some 
cases, the MCL scheduled may be almost flat and the lender 
will find that costs can be minimized for almost any 
amount of funds by restricting lending to large, experienced 
borrowers . If borrowing costs are low enough, because of 
negative real rates of interest, borrowers of large amounts 
will be willing to absorb essentially all of these loans . 
Additional costs to lenders 
In many cases, formal lenders are required to provide 
other services in rural areas besides credit and savings 
deposits. Loan supervision, education extension , or tech-
nical assistance for farmers may be among these services . 
Where the lender is required to provide these to borrowers, 
lender ' s costs are substantially increased . Costs of pro-
viding intensively supervised credit, for example, may run 
to 25 percent or more of the loan value . These educa-
tional costs , when the lender is not reimbursed , f urther 
discourage lenders from servicing target groups who re-
quire supervision. In a number of countries, governments 
attempt to tie extension programs to formal lending 
activities in order to provide educational services to 
borrowers. This may yield very mixed results. In all 
cases, it is difficult to coordinate credit with supervision 
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when two or more agencies are involved. If the extension 
agents become heavily involved in the loan process, it may 
be unclear who is responsible for following up on repay-
ment. An extension agent may help to approve loans and 
then have little incentive to encourage repayment. Govern-
ment subsidies for lenders to cover their supervision costs, 
or special incentives for extension agents to act ag-
gressively and properly in the loan approval and recovery 
process are partial resolutions to this dilemma. 
Share of credit to small farmers 
Low rates of interest reduce the propensity of formal 
lenders to service small farmers. All lenders, sooner or 
later, no matter what their objectives, are forced to 
find some kind of balance between revenues and costs. 
Interest payments constitute the main source of revenues 
for a credit agency. Low rates of interest generate low 
revenues, which are often not sufficient to cover all the 
costs of delivering credit to small farmers. Given strong 
pressures on an institution to keep its costs in line with 
revenues, and given the shape of the cost functions in-
volved, the agency is forced to reduce the proportion of 
its portfolio devoted to small farmers. By increasing the 
average size of loan,. the institution can bring down 
average costs. Where the potential for government subsidies 
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is limited or uncertain, such a cost reduction may be a 
necessity for survival [10). 
If the rates of interest that are allowed to charge 
do not cover their average costs, it is not surprising to 
find that profit-maximizing institutions like commercial 
banks are reluctant to serve the rural areas. Losses 
are also a hazard for public institutions, even though 
they may attempt to rationalize them in terms of ''social" 
objectives. Public lending institutions cannot be sure 
that they will permanently receive ample funds from their 
governments, or from international donors. In any case, 
the continuous receipt of such outside funds subjects the 
institution to an undesirable dependency on the political-
administrative process of allocating public funds, and 
leaves it highly vulnerable to political pressures . It is 
not realistic to assume that small farmers will always have 
enough political power to maintain a substantial alloca-
tion of funds in their favor. 
Lack of sufficient and timely appropriations can 
severely impair the efficient functioning of any subsidy-
dependent institution that serves small farmers. The 
continuity of the program itself, the possibility of 
achieving its goals, not to speak of the possibility of 
expanding the program to reach more of the target popula-
tion, are all threatened by continuing losses [10]. The 
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prospect of a disappearance of its capital due to high and 
persistent operational losses, leads either to the elimi-
nation of the program or to its reorganization away from 
the service of the small farmer. 
Credit rationing 
Another influence working against small farmers is that 
the low rates of interest charged tend to generate an excess 
demand for institutional funds. At the rate of interest 
set, there are more potential clients willing to borrow 
than those who could be satisfied with the institutional 
resources available, so that some nonprice mechanism for 
rationing becomes necessary. The lending institution must 
select the beneficiaries of the credit program, re-
jecting other potential users of its funds . The lower 
the rate of interest, the more extensive is the excess 
demand generated, and the greater will be the reliance of 
lenders on rationing devices for allocation of their limited 
funds. The lower the rate of interest and the higher the 
implied subsidy, thenthe greater will be the motivation of 
borrowers to exert social and political power in order to 
capture it. The lower the rate of interest and the greater 
the potential losses for credit institutions, the more like-
ly it will be to succumb to such political pressures . 
The nonprice rationing to allocate scarce funds emerges 
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in three basic forms; the first is to allocate fixed loan 
quotas on the basis of how much land a borrower has in a 
particular enterprise. This might be expressed in money 
terms such as one thousand pesos per hectare of rice, 
in physical terms like 600 pounds of chemical fertilizer 
per hectare of rice, or some combination of money and 
physical inputs [10]. 
The second technique of allocating concessionally 
priced credit is for the lender to place heavy emphasis 
on collateral or the borrowers credit rating. This results 
in the lender extending loans mainly to large landowners 
and to borrowers with whom the lender has previous lending 
experiences. New borrowers and persons with small amounts 
of collateral are generally denied formal loans under 
these criteria . 
The third manner in which lenders ration credit is 
more subtle and less obvious to the casual observer of 
RFMs. This rationing is done by imposing different loan 
transaction costs on various classes of borrowers. If the 
borrower already has a satisfactory track record with the 
lender, borrows large amounts , and provides the lender 
with ample collateral, the borrower's loan transaction costs 
of ten make up a very small proportion of total borrowing 
costs . The borrower may be able to negotiate a new loan 
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through a simple telephone call to the lender . In thi s case, 
the borrowing costs are made up almost entirely by the 
interest payments made on the loans. 
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CHAPTER VI . ANALYTICAL MODEL 
Demand and supply of credit in the agricultural sector 
of a developing country may theoretically be analyzed util-
izing a production model of a competitive industry (33] . 
This production model , Figure 6, consists of the out-
put market and two resource markets - the institutional 
credit market and the informal credit market. Three 
equations of this model are specified a priori. They 
include the supply of institutional credit, the supply of 
informal credit and the demand for final output . Endogenously 
determined equations are demand for institutional credit, 
demand for informal credit and supply of agricultural out-
put . 
It is assumed tha t farmers utilize two factors of 
production and that costs of production are minimized. 
Factors of production are circulating capital (X2 ), which 
includes all variable inputs such as fertilizer , pesticides , 
etc., and f ixed capital (X1 ) which includes land, labor , 
etc . The type of capital required will determine the 
market in which a farmer will demand credit. If a farmer 
wishes to increase use of a variable factor of production , 
he will demand credit from the informal lender who has a 
limited supply of credit , but who would be willing to 
make available small amounts of credit at relatively high 
100 
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Figure 6 . Production model 
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rates of interest. If a farmer requires additional fixed 
inputs, he will demand credit from institutional sources 
who have a greater supply of credit at reduced rates of 
interest. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the demand for fixed 
and circulating capital are inter-related and that the 
price of each good is exogenously determined. 
Given these assumptions, the farms' production func -
tion is: 
(12) 
Assuming given factor prices, P1 and P2 , and a given 
product price, P, the cost of production can be minimized 
subject to the output level. 
c = PlXl + P2X2 cost function (.13} 
L = PlXl + P2X2 + ,\ [Q-f (Xl x2 )] constrained i( 14) minimization 
Ll = pl - ,\fl = 0 (15) 
L2 = p2 - ,\f 2 = 0 ( 16) 
L,\ = Q - f (X1 ,x2 ) = 0 (17) 
Equations 15, 16 and 17 represent first order conditions for 
minimizing costs of production, assuming second order 
conditions are met. These equations may be solved for 
x1 , x2 and ,\ in terms of the parameters P1 , P2 and Q. 
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xl = gl(Pl p2 Q} (18) 
x2 = g2(Pl p2 Q} (19) 
>. = g>.(Pl p2 Q} ( 2 0} 
Equations 18 and 19 are explicit e xpressions f or the factor 
demand curves when output is held constant . Equation 20 
represents the marginal cost of output. 
Four rules on which the elasticity of derived demand 
depends are : [ 3 3] 
I. "The demand for anything is likely to be more 
elastic the more readily substitutes for that 
thing can be obtained" . 
II. "The demand for anything is likely to be less 
elastic, the less important is the part played 
by the cost of that thing in the total cost of 
some other thing, in the production of which 
it is employed." 
III. "The demand for anything is likely to be more 
elastic, the more elastic is the supply of 
cooperant agents of production ." 
IV. "The demand for anything is likely to be more 
elastic, the more elastic is the demand for any 
further thing which it contributes to produce. " 
Given these guidelines, we may arrive at several con-
clusions regarding the shape of demand curves for insti-
tutional as well as informal sources of credit. Informal 
lenders provide small amounts of credit at relatively high 
rates of interest. Substitutes for informal credit are 
not readily available to the small borrower. Conse-
quently , farmers will continue to demand credit from 
informal sources at high interest rates. Changes in the 
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interest rate will not result in significant changes in 
the demand for informal credit. We may conclude that 
the demand for credit from informal sources (X2 ) is price 
inelastic. This demand curve is illustrated in Figure 7, 
panel 2. 
In comparison, institutional sources provide larger 
amounts of credit at lower rates of interst. In many 
instances, the informal lender may easily replace insti-
tutional credit . Large farmers will generally be responsive 
to changes in institutional rates of interest. The demand 
for institutional credit (X1 ) is price elastic. The 
demand curve is illustrated in Figure 7, panel 1. 
The long-run industry supply curve, Figure 7, panel 
3, is a horizontal summation of individual firm long-run 
supply curves assuming there are no externalities. 
It is useful to determine the response of a cost-· 
minimizing farm to changes in the parameters they face. 
More specifically, how does such a farm owner react to 
an increase or decrease in a factor price? We may wish 
to determine whether more or less of an input will be used 
when its own or some other input's price increases . 
In conducting comparative statics analysis , it is 
necessary to first substitute the solutions (7-9) into 
the first order equations (4-6) from which they were 
solved. This yields the identities: 
s 
p 
x2 
c 
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Figure 7. ~reduction model: Endogenously and exogenously 
determined equations 
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pl - ft.(Pl p2 Q) fl[Xl (Pl p2 Q)' X2(Pl p2 Q) ] = 0 
( :2 I) 
p2 = ft.(Pl p2 Q) f2[Xl (Pl p2 Q), X2(Pl p2 Q)] = 0 
(22) 
Q - f [X1 (Pl p2 Q) , X2(Pl p2 
Q)] - 0 (23) 
The economic significance of this step is that it is 
now being asserted that whatever the factor prices and 
output level may be, the firm will always instantaneously 
adjust the factor inputs to those levels which will 
minimize the total cost of that output level. Given 
this assertion, the parameters of this model may be 
altered to determine resulting changes in the factors of 
production. 
We may begin the analysis by observing the cost-
minimizing reaction to a change in P1 , the rate of 
interest on institutional credit. The identities (21-
23) must be differentiated with respect to the parameter 
1 -
ax1 ax2 
fl 
a>. 0 (24) ).f 11 ap >.f 12 al> ()pl -1 1 
-).f 21 
ax1 
/.f 22 
ax2 a>.. 0 ( 2 5) 
aP1 ~ - f2 aP1 -1 
-f 
ax1 
- f 
ax2 0 ( 2 6) 1 ~ 2 aP1 -
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These relations may be summarized using matrix notation. 
- ),f - ), f 12 - f ax1/aP; -~ 11 1 A = - ),f 21 - ),f 22 f 2 ax2 /aP1 = ( 27) 
-f -f 0 ()!./()Pl 1 2 
using Cramer's rule : 
-1 - ), f 12 -f 1 
0 - ), f 22 -f 2 
ax1 0 -f 0 
()pl = 2 
6 
till 
= ---ti- < 0 (28) 
where 6 is the determinant of 
6 ·-1.f lf 12 £ 2 
2 = + ), f 1f22 + 
2 
2f l f 2fl2 = + l. [fll f2 -
6 < 0 if soc hold 
6 - f2 = 11 2 
Again , using Cramer's rule: 
- ), f 11 -1 -f 1 
- A. f 21 0 - f 2 
ax2 -f 0 0 6 21 () pl = 
1 ( 29 ) = 11 > 0 6 
where 
6 21 = 
-fl 
2 
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Generally, 6
21 
will not be known, therefore the sign 
ax2 . of ap- will be indeterminate. However, f o r the two vari-
1 
able case, one factor must be substituted for the other 
to maintain output at a constant level . 
The above results, Equations 28 a nd 29, are repre-
sented graphically in Fi gure 8. 
Similar relations may be derive d for input responses 
to a change in P 2 , moneylender rates of interest. 
- >- f 11 - ). f 12 -f 1 ax 1/aP2 
0 
B = - ). f 21 - >- f 22 -f 2 ax 2;aP 2 = -1 ( 3 0 ) 
-f 
1 -f 2 0 a>./a P 2 0 
again solving by Cramer's rule: 
- >- f 11 0 -f 1 
- >- f 21 -1 -f 2 
ax 2 -f 0 0 6 22 1 
0 
ap2 
= = - 6- < 
6 
(31) 
where 6 22 = -f 2 1 
0 - f 12 -f l 
-1 - f 22 -f 2 
ax1 0 -f 0 6 12 2 
aP2 
= = ~ > 0 6 (32) 
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Figure 8 . Effects of an increase in the factor price R1 on 
the equilibrium of the one out~ut - two factors of 
production model 
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Generally , ~ 22 will not be known, therefore the sign 
of ax
1
/aP
2 
will be in determinate . However, for the two 
variable case , one factor must act as a substitute for 
the other such that output remains constant. 
The above partials may be empirically tested by 
specifying regression equations of the form: 
l = 1,2 
Equations 22 and 23 are represented graphically in 
Figure 9. 
Formal financial institutions are primarily utilized 
by the large farmer. Thus , a change in the interest rate 
on institutional loans (R1 ) will have its greatest initial 
impact on the large farmer . As R1 increases , the large 
farmer will demand less credit from banks and other 
f inancial institutions. The short-run alternative to 
institutional credit is the village moneylender who 
supplies credit at relatively high rates of interest. 
Larg e farmers will not demand credit from the moneylender 
at such rates. As a result, a substantia l number of large 
farmers will drop out of the credit market. Industry 
output will subsequently decrease. While we see the demand 
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effects, supply of credit is also affected by the rising 
interest rates. At higher rates of interest, institutions 
will be willing to make more credit available and also 
more willing to grant an increased number of loans. We 
see from Figure 3 that as institutions expand their loan 
portfolio, they will be more willing to grant loans to 
small farmers . An increasing number of small farmers will 
turn to institutional sources. Demand for credit in the 
informal market will decrease temporarily. However, there 
are many small farmers in the informal market who go 
completely unserviced by the moneylender. As the money-
lender has more money available he will grant loans to 
those he formerly considered to be risky prospects. 
The increase in number of small farmers who are now 
able to produce more will not be able to produce an 
amount equal to that of the large farmer who has dropped 
out of the institutional market. As a result, industry 
output will decrease. 
This analysis must be considered in context of the 
relationship of the two factors of production. If x
1 
and x2 are substitutes the above analysis holds true . 
Alternatively, if x
1 
and x
2 
are complements, as the use 
of x1 decreases , x2 will decrease also, causing a substan-
tial decrease in industry output. 
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Figure 9 . Effects o f an increase in the factor price R2 on 
the equilibrium of the one output - two factors of 
production model 
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Village moneylenders are primarily utilized by the 
small farmer. Thus, a change in the interest rate on 
informal loans (R2 ) will have its greatest impact on the 
small farmer . Demand for informal credit is relatively 
inelastic. Consequently, changes in the interest rate 
will not cause significant changes in demand. Small 
farmers do not have immediate alternatives to the village 
moneylender. As a result, credit demand is virtually 
unresponsive to price changes. Given any price change , a 
fraction of consumers will be priced out of the market. 
Demand for informal credit will, therefore, decrease 
slightly. Those farmers who were previously serviced by 
the village moneylender will turn to institutional sources 
of credit. Such action will cause a slight increase in 
demand for institutional credit. The increased demand 
pressure on the institutional market would normally cause 
interest rates to rise. However, under government regu-
lations, interest rates on agricultural loans will remain 
unchanged. Agricultural output will decrease slightly as 
small farmers must decrease production. 
This analysis must be considered in context of the 
relationship of the two factors of production . If x1 and 
x 2 are substitutes, the above analysis holds true . Alterna-
tively, if x 1 and x 2 are complements, asx1 decrease, x2 will 
consequently decrease, causing a substantial decrease in 
output. 
113 
CHAPTER VII . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The general objective of this study has been to evalu-
ate the role of credit in the development of small farm 
households in developing countries. The specific ob-
jectives were : 1) to evaluate inefficiencies resulting 
from credit rationing , 2) to evaluate the role of informal 
moneylenders in the existence of small farm households, 
3) to evaluate the role of formal financial institutions 
in the existence of small farm households, 4) to evaluate 
institutional behavior when confronted with artificial 
operating constraints, 5) to specify factors affecting the 
farmers ' use of credit, a nd 6) to evaluate the effects 
that concessionally priced loans may have on lender, as 
well as borrower behavior. 
Objectives one through six were accomplished by con-
ducting a literature survey of relevant material on each 
subject area . Empirical results of all studies were com-
pared and contrasted. 
Conclusions 
The micro level role of financial intermediation 
encompasses the most significant function of intermediaries . 
That function is the granting of loans to individual 
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farmers . Capital supply affects final output and the size 
of any economic surpluses realized, which affects the 
savings capacity of the agricultural sector. 
Inefficient allocation of financial resources by 
formal institutions is the most severe problem a de-
veloping country's agricultural sector may encounter . 
Such allocations result in output and production distor-
tions. Village monelenders have aided in correcting those 
distortions. By granting loans to marginal customers and 
assuming great risk, the village moneylender has become 
the primary supplier of financial resources for the small 
farmer . The moneylender provides other valuable services 
to the small farm household. It is for these reasons that 
his services should not be eliminated, but rather aug-
mented, as well as, duplicated by formal institutions. 
Formal financial institutions typically behave as 
profit maximizers and risk averters. As such, large 
agricultural borrowers constitute a high pe rcentage of the 
proportion of an institution's portfolio allocated to 
a g ricultural loans. 
The economic behavior of specialized public insti-
tutions will ultimately resemble that of other institutions . 
Specialized institutions cannot bear continuous default and 
nonrepayment . In an attempt to maintain their viability 
they too, decrease their volume of loans to small farmers . 
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Concessionally priced loans are the root cause of 
resource allocation distortions. Reduced interest rates 
on agricultural loans encourage financial institutions to 
direct their good to the consumer who represents the least 
amount of risk. This behavior leads to capital-intensive 
production by large farmers, labor-intensive production 
by small farmers and reduced agricultural production . 
Raising the contractural rate of interest on agricultural 
loans will ultimately redistribute credit in such a manner 
a s to allocate a more equitable share of capital to small 
farmers. 
Policy Recommendations 
This study is a composite of research conducted on 
many developing countries throughout the world . As such , 
any policy recommendations must be viewed in context of 
the socio- economic conditions which prevail in a country. 
However, certain implications of this study might be rele-
vant for most developing countries given that rural 
financ ial market policies are quite similar across de-
veloping countries. 
Many inefficiencies have been generated by various 
rural financial market policies . Small farmer production 
has suffered greatly as a result of capital constraints 
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levied by formal financial institutions. Financial re-
sources have been allocated such that large farmers have 
an e xcess of funds and small farmers experience severe 
shortages. It is essential that such inefficiencies be 
corrected if the agricultural sector is to e xperience the 
necessary growth and development. 
Several developing countries have implemented con-
cessional interest rate policies in an attempt to make 
financial resources available to the agricultural sector 
at reduced costs . Such interest rate policies typically 
affect the nominal rates of interest . Interest rate poli-
cies can have very severe negative affects on a country's 
economy . The effects of interest rate policies on the 
agricultural sector are more pronounced and more severe. 
The reallocations of financial resources resulting from 
concessional interest rate policies has caused many dis-
tortions in the agricultural sector. Raising the nominal 
rate or contractural rate of interest will aid in cor-
recting many of these di stortions. Increasing the nominal 
rate of interest will ultimately lead to a decrease in 
demand for institutional credit by large borrowers. Financial 
institutions will also be willing to grant a larger volume 
of loans to small farmers. Any additional capital small 
farmers receive will have a greater impact on his final 
output than if that same capital were given to a large 
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farmer . 
There have been many criticisms of the informal money-
lender in developing countries . It has bee n suggested that 
moneylenders extract monopoly profits, do not provide 
legitimate economic services and charge exhorbitant 
rates of interest. This study has revealed that informal 
lenders provide a major portion of credit to small farmers 
and rural households in general. Given the moneylenders 
importance in the rural economy, attempts should be made 
to strengthen them and to aid in their delivery of fi-
nancial resources to the small farmer. Not only is the 
village moneylender more familiar to the small farmer, but 
he also has greater insight into the problems, customs, 
and needs of the rural poor . 
While institutions may be able to provide essential 
financia l services to the rural poor , a farmer ' s needs 
do not stop there . Rather, farmers must have available 
input markets , output markets and effective marketing 
facili ties . The village moneylender, who i s often a 
shopkeeper, is able to provide such valuable services to 
the farmer. Institutions are also averse to granting loans 
for consumption purposes. The moneylender is willing to 
grant loans to aid in stabilization of consumption activi-
ties. Capital requirements for consumption and production 
purposes are not easily separable for the small farmer. His 
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level of production is often strongly correlated to his 
consumption activities. 
The village moneylender provides many valuable 
services to the rural poor. If the agricultural sector 
is to experience an adequate rate of growth, financial 
institutions must begin to provide services similar to 
those of the moneylenders. 
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